Though it has not done so explicitly, the second Trump administration has put a premium on rebuilding and expanding the Monroe Doctrine. Actions taken to uphold the doctrine have included strikes on Venezuelan drug runners, economic support for Argentina, and even expansionist musings in Greenland and elsewhere.
These activities have been slandered as betrayals of President Donald Trump’s America First philosophy. The Economist compared Trump’s threats to Venezuela with the war on terror, and Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene (R-GA) said Trump’s aid to Argentina was “a punch in the gut.”
But an examination of the Trump administration’s major moves reveals something quite different: a vigorous expansion of the Monroe Doctrine – to include a protection of both oceans, in particular the Atlantic – that is simultaneously in line with an America First agenda and a departure from decades of liberal internationalist intervention.
I. A Doctrine for All Polarities
The Monroe Doctrine has never been obsolete. The Doctrine was established in the 1820s, long before policymakers used terms like “bipolarity” or “multipolar.” But the world – at least, the parts of world with which the new United States was concerned – was very much a multipolar one. Britain, France, Russia, and Spain were all active near the borders of the United States and frequently possessed greater power to shape global affairs.
To Americans, this multipolarity was, de facto, bipolar: it was their country against everyone else. By 1823, America had grown to cover most of North America, minus the Mexican Empire and British Canada, and included the entirety of the East Coast – but it had not yet gathered the strength to fully control that vast territory. The Americans were not just worried about their old enemies, the British, or even their sometimes-ally, the French: the Russians had only recently claimed all the Pacific northwest north of the 51st parallel and banned any ships from entering it within 100 miles.
To quell these fears, President James Monroe – at the urging of his Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams – declared in 1823 that “the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers.” Existing colonial claims, Monroe added, would not be interfered with, but it was “impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can anyone believe that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition in any form with indifference.”
This statement of policy, which came to be known as the Monroe Doctrine, was somewhat unenforceable at the time. European powers continually ignored the edict: one of many examples would be the placement of a Habsburg on the Mexican throne by the French decades later.
But Monroe laid down a marker which future presidents repeatedly referred to and expanded. Importantly, Theodore Roosevelt expanded Monroe’s edict with the Roosevelt Corollary in 1904, holding that “chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may…ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power.” No longer would the Monroe Doctrine be about keeping Europeans out: it was now, for the 20th century, augmented to keeping any rabble-rousers in the Americas at bay.
Successive American presidential administrations studiously upheld the expanded doctrine by playing a geopolitical game of whack-a-mole with socialist or socialistically-inclined governments throughout the Cold War. While this activity tapered off as the Cold War ended, the United States continued to operate throughout the Americas in ways consistent with the thrust of the Doctrine, such as the Bush administration’s invasion of Haiti in 2004.
The point is that the popular view of the Monroe Doctrine as a dormant and unfashionable doctrine is only a recent phenomenon. The Monroe Doctrine can be said to be supra-polar: it has directed US policy in the Americas through multipolar, bipolar, unipolar, and again multipolar worlds. No matter how many adversaries there are for the United States, the Americas must remain free of the influence of any non-American state, because it is impossible to predict with perfect accuracy which foreign states will become adversaries.
This takes on increased importance in the specific circumstances of today’s multipolar world. Multipolarity introduces increasingly complex issues, chief among them the oftentimes shifting definition of ally and adversary. The multipolar world of the 1930s and 1940s saw the Soviet Union as a German ally, an American ally, and then an American adversary, in the span of only just over four years.
Predicting who the ultimate opponent will be, if such an opponent will even exist, is also difficult. Much has been made about China being this century’s Soviet Union. But it is important to remember that the USSR only rose to challenge America when the century was half-finished. Before then, Germany was arguably the closest to a “pole” which could challenge the United States.
Yes, the People’s Republic of China is unquestionably our chief adversary today, and likely will be for the next few decades. But what of 2060? 2100?
Every president has placed their imprint on the Monroe Doctrine, and the Trump administration shall be no different in this respect. We are in the midst of the development of a Trump Corollary, which updates longstanding policy to the multipolar world of the 21st century. Two pillars are already obvious and should be taken further. First, the Trump Corollary requires that no other power gain meaningful influence, including economic influence, in our hemisphere. And second, the Trump Corollary holds that no other power gains primacy in either the Atlantic or Pacific Oceans, and that the north Atlantic Ocean, in particular, remains an American lake.
II. Two Pillars
The Trump administration has taken several steps, discussed below, to put its Corollary into effect and to restore the Monroe Doctrine to a central place in American foreign policy. While these moves have been admirable, there are several places where they could go further.
The First Pillar: The Primacy of US Influence in the Americas
The Trump administration has placed a premium on ensuring that no other power gains influence in the Americas. Past articulations of the Monroe Doctrine and the Roosevelt Corollary did not extend to all powers (President Monroe was just focused on Europe, and President Roosevelt on potential “chronic wrongdoing” undertaken by American nations). Neither extended the Doctrine definitively to economic influence.
The first pillar of the Trump Corollary covers both, asserting that no other nation should be able to exert undue influence in the Americas, militarily or economically.
Combatting Economic Influence
The Trump administration’s efforts in Panama provide a striking illustration of the expansion of the Monroe Doctrine to embrace economic influence as an area of concern. Theodore Roosevelt helped create the country itself and then, in exchange, purchased what became the Panama Canal Zone. Although Jimmy Carter naively gave up the zone, its protection – as a crucial waterway – has remained a critical American interest.
But by early 2025, Chinese companies – and therefore, the Chinese Communist Party – had purchased ports on both sides of the canal. As China is a major adversary, such a situation was self-evidently unacceptable to America’s national interest. The Panama Canal Zone is geographically extremely small; its outsize economic importance is obvious. But so too is its symbolic importance: if China comes to understand that it can effectively take control of the most important waterway in the Americas through economic means, it will be a signal of weak US resolve. This will, in turn, encourage further Chinese intrusion into the Americas.
Immediately upon re-taking the presidency, President Trump made economic control of the Panama Canal Zone a top priority, highlighting the need for American control in an address to Congress. Panama was also a major part of Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s first trip abroad. The Trump administration’s efforts, at least initially, paid off, with Panama agreeing to seek a sale of the canal’s ports.
But lately, that agreement has stalled due to Chinese resistance. The Trump administration has, for now, sought to solve the issue with diplomacy, seeking to pressure China to hand over economic control of the canal. But they should not wait too long for the PRC to hand it over, nor should they settle for a deal which leaves Chinese-controlled companies with any say over the canal’s operation. When America handed the canal over to Panama, both sides agreed to “maintain the regime of neutrality.” Panama failing to do so does not mean America must fail to do so as well. If China continues to block the sale of the ports, and Panama proves unwilling to force a sale, the United States should seize control of them.
Preemption and Deterrence
The Trump administration has not just sought to evict foreign powers from having economic influence in the Americas. The Corollary also permits pre-emptive actions to forestall any foreign footholds. This follows naturally from the expansion of the Doctrine to combat economic influence, which can be gradually and opaquely extended by adversaries until they suddenly threaten American interests. By taking forceful preemptive action, the Trump Corollary aims at creating effective deterrence among its adversaries and effective alignment among its hemispheric neighbors.
Argentina was recently the site of some of these actions. In 2023, libertarian Javier Milei ascended to the Argentine presidency. While Milei’s economic policies – free-trade libertarianism and smaller government – were remarkably different from Trump’s economic nationalism, he had cast his movement in Trumpian terms, seeking to “Make Argentina Great Again.” The two leaders quickly struck up a friendship, with Milei meeting Trump in early 2024 and, after Trump’s victory, at Mar-A-Lago. Trump, for his part, called the Argentinian his “favorite president.”
Earlier this year, Milei fell into trouble. A series of scandals had weakened his standing, and his platform – while showing signs of success – was slow-moving. A local election loss in Buenos Aires in September compounded his problems. Ahead of crucial parliamentary elections in October, analysts began to question if Milei’s agenda was dead in the water.
But then Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent rallied Argentine markets – and Milei’s political hopes – with the announcement of a $20 billion dollar/peso credit swap. Milei quickly flew to Washington to meet with Bessent and Trump, who buoyed the libertarian’s hopes by doubling the swap to $40 billion and adding that the administration would import more Argentine beef. A few weeks later, their bet paid off: Milei’s party romped, even beating their leftist opposition in Buenos Aires, the equivalent of the GOP winning a senate contest in California.
Before Milei’s victory at the polls, there were a host of complaints within the United States, including from some on the right, about the Trump administration’s actions. Most centered around asking how it could possibly be “America First” to bail out another country and to import beef competitive with domestic agriculture. While some complaints were simply political posturing from Democrats, many complaints also came from Republicans, such as “America Only” Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene (R-GA)’s aforementioned description of it being “a punch in the gut.”
These complaints fundamentally misunderstood the nature of the America First movement and the Trump Corollary. America First does not, and has never meant, no engagement with the rest of the world. It has certainly not meant no engagement with the Americas. Even in America’s “isolationist” inter-war era, the United States was active throughout its hemisphere first and foremost to ensure its own security.
In the past, the US was active to keep foreign powers, be they Spain or the Soviets, militarily out of the Americas. But in the 21st century’s globalized economy, foreign adversaries can easily gain economic leverage in our hemisphere without ever deploying any military assets. China had been making inroads in Argentina before Milei – who came to power on an avowedly anti-China and pro-American platform – won power at the expense of the leftist Peronists. The Chinese certainly felt this way: their embassy in Buenos Aires lambasted President Trump’s ambassador nominee, Peter Lamelas, for highlighting the Personists’ projects with the Chinese. Specifically, the Chinese said his comments “[provoked] a sensation of concern about the possible return of the Monroe Doctrine.”
These concerns are revealing: China had assumed that it had free rein to expand its economic influence in the Americas. This is why aiding Milei was so crucial in reasserting the continued vitality of the Monroe Doctrine. It is a signal to China that its long campaigns of creeping economic influence will not be welcomed in the hemisphere.
It is also real-time proof to other governments in the Americas that working with the United States and rejecting foreign influence can help you at home. This underscores an important point. Actions abroad are often categorized as offering carrots or threatening with sticks. The Monroe Doctrine must be enforced with both. Too heavy of a reliance on militarism will incur backlash, particularly in a multipolar world. America’s Cold War activities in Central and South America – necessary as they were – engendered a backlash in the form of the “Pink Tide” which washed across Central and South America in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Fortunately for the United States, this overlaid the unipolar moment, and no adversaries could properly latch onto a wave of anti-Americanism.
But now, multiple poles are coming into existence which very much will be able to latch onto anti-Americanism. And while America’s military can, and should, be used in certain parts of the hemisphere, allies and potential allies should be reminded that the carrot exists as well.
Though Milei won solidly in the October elections, due to Argentina’s staggered electoral process, his party does not have a majority in Argentina’s congress. The Trump administration should continue to make a positive example of Argentina by aiding Milei’s political standing and helping to ensure he wins re-election in 2027.
Restoring the Basics
It should be clear that the Trump administration’s elaborations on the tradition of the Monroe Doctrine does not come at the expense of its other historical commitments. This is the case in Venezuela, where the Trump administration has sought to evict socialist President Nicolas Maduro from power in a manner that simply reasserts the continued vitality of the basics of the policy.
As of this writing, the United States has positioned a large military force in the Caribbean Sea. They have also used this force: several drug running boats and submarines have been destroyed. Skeptics have decried the Trump administration’s actions here, with Senator Rand Paul (R-KY) saying the boat strikes “go against all of our tradition.”
But this is simply an application of the Roosevelt Corollary. As Roosevelt argued, “chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society” demands American action. And Maduro’s allowance of drug shipments to the United States is unabashedly either wrongdoing or impotence. Some, such as the aforementioned Senator Paul, have tried to argue that Venezuela is only responsible for a small portion of drugs entering the United States. This is entirely irrelevant to the conversation and should be discarded as a serious talking point. Any amount of dangerous drugs being imported by a foreign adversary should be stopped.
But even without the drug trade, the Trump administration is right to seek Maduro’s overthrow consistent with the original Monroe Doctrine view that no other nation should challenge US military influence in the Americas. Maduro has hosted Russian bombers, warships, and soldiers, all within the past few years. Russia has even toyed with establishing a military base off of Venezuela’s coast and has repeatedly sent military equipment to Caracas. The country is, in short, just steps away from hosting a full-fledged military base. And if Russia can gain influence there, China – which has significantly more money to throw around – could likely do so as well.
As mentioned in the previous section, American states can have their own foreign policies; even advocates of a muscular foreign policy like Roosevelt did not argue America should territorialize all of Central and South America.
But those foreign policies simply cannot include the hosting of non-American militaries. Reports indicate that Maduro has sought to offer the Trump administration various deals, including an offer to leave power in 2028, with his vice president and loyalist taking power until the early 2030s. Such offers should not be taken seriously, as they are transparent attempts by Maduro to put off leaving power until he can work out a way to get out of the deal.
Unlike America’s far-off interventions, where there was no real opposition in place nor history of democracy, Venezuela has a thriving opposition and a long history of democratic governance. The Trump administration should continue to pressure Maduro to leave immediately and to take his entire system with him, using its economic and, if need be, military power. Failure to do so will allow adversaries to gain economic and, later on, military footholds in the Americas.
The Second Pillar: Oceanic Dominance
For most of its history, the Monroe Doctrine was commonly understood to refer to the territory of Central and South America. The Trump Corollary, as a 21st century expansion of the Doctrine, has clarified that it extends north, east, and west throughout the hemisphere, as well.
Between his election victory and second swearing-in, President Trump met with then-Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau. Only Trump did not refer to him as such, instead referring to him as “governor,” and to his country as the 51st state. Trump’s ostensible trolling continued after he took office, as he repeatedly told Trudeau and his successor, Mark Carney, that Canada would be better off as part of America.
Trump’s expansionist desires also applied to Canada’s Arctic neighbor, Greenland; in the same address in which he demanded the return of the Panama Canal, Trump argued, “We need Greenland for national security and even international security, and we’re working with everybody involved to try and get it,” adding, “One way or the other, we’re going to get it.” His administration followed up with a high-profile visit to Greenland by Vice President JD Vance and, reportedly, intelligence gathering operations on how best to spur independence.
The Danish, who nominally control Greenland, were shocked.
America has previously taken action in Central and South America under the Doctrine because those were the regions of the Americas in which other rivalrous world powers could have had some influence. In contrast, Canada is a British subject, and for most of its history that actually meant something. Likewise, Greenland has been under the control of NATO ally Denmark for longer than America has existed. Both were considered dependable, civilizational allies throughout much of the 20th century.
But modernity and the multipolar world has eviscerated those certainties. Canada has proven concerningly susceptible to Chinese intelligence operations, and its rapid import of Indian immigrants is fundamentally changing the nature of Canadian society and its politics toward potential American competitors. And as America draws its attention away from Europe – and as Europe continues to Islamize – its ability to trust that Denmark remains a like-minded ally is increasingly coming under question.
The implications for American control of its hemisphere are obvious. Canada spans the entirety of America’s northern border. Canada being a stalwart ally during the Cold War made things significantly easier for the United States: unlike the Soviet Union, which had an increasingly aggressive China to its east and NATO to its west, the United States could breathe easy on its immediate borders. The great white north is also resource-rich and lightly populated. If Canada drifted toward another pole – or if it was unable to defend itself in the event of an incursion – it would be disastrous for American national security.
Canada need not come under the domain of the Stars and Stripes for American to achieve the security that it needs. But the American government should seriously consider support for Canadian separatist movements, and – if necessary – Canada’s western regions should be territorialized by the United States, especially if the country makes clear it wishes to go on an adversarial path.
Greenland is resource-rich too – the island is rich in rare earths – but its geographic location is its real treasure. For the duration of the Cold War, the Atlantic Ocean was effectively a Western lake. Yes, Russian submarines no doubt navigated its depths, but all major states which bordered it – particularly the northern Atlantic – were either America or American allies.
This is no longer the case. As multipolarity shakes NATO and our close alliances in Europe, the United States must seek out ways to ensure that the north Atlantic does not shift from being an American lake to being an adversarial swamp. Even if America remains close with Greenland, its potential independence – and the potential for an independent Greenland to deepen its relationship with China, Russia, or another pole – is an unacceptable risk.
In World War II, America occupied Greenland rather than risk a German takeover. While America does not need to send in the troops immediately, the Trump administration should continue its attempts to discern if a peaceful territorialization is possible. Should that not be the case, Greenland should be, if necessary, occupied by the United States, rather than it be allowed to be spun off into the hands of an adversarial pole.
III. A Continued Evolution
The two pillars of the Trump Corollary will, down the line, require America to take further actions to secure the Western Hemisphere. Colombia, one of the last bastions of the Pink Tide, is a potential trouble spot, as is Brazil (though Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva has struck a more pliant path as of late, warming up to Trump and vetoing Venezuela’s entry into the BRICS organization). Cuba too could prove troublesome if it deigned to repeat its Cold War role, with the Chinese replacing the Soviets.
Africa’s west coast could present an issue for control of the Atlantic, but – for the time being – those nations are either American allies or are far too weak to be of any threat. American strategic planners should, however, ensure that those countries do not become launching points for the ships or planes of adversaries.
The Trump administration has been the first in the 21st century to recognize the multipolar world, and it has been the first to place the Monroe Doctrine in its rightful place at the top of America’s foreign policy priorities. But it has done so piecemeal, without drawing a broad, clear-cut rationale for their actions. This has allowed opponents of American activity abroad – from libertarians at home to adversaries around the world – to castigate each effort with separate, individual attacks. But by clearly connecting their activities under a Trump Corollary, the administration can rebut those attacks and create a roadmap for future administrations to follow.
A Monroe Doctrine poorly enforced, or one not augmented for the times in which we live, will send a message to all adversarial poles that they have nothing to fear from encroaching into the American hemisphere. We should disabuse them of this illusion.
