Although President Biden once met with Xi Jinping and declared “there need not be a new Cold War,” America has thoroughly done away with Biden and that worldview. Marco Rubio said it. Elbridge Colby said it. So did Mike Waltz. Washington’s rapidly solidifying rhetorical consensus of a “new Cold War” against China is increasingly bipartisan and fashionable.
But you could call it a Cold War in name and little else. We can publicly agree that China represents a Soviet-level threat, but what does countering that threat actually look like? Bipartisan spending bills and subsidies to chip manufacturers. Congressional delegations to Taiwan. Revitalizing America’s industrial base, reshoring advanced technology production, and engaging with allies are all necessary parts of competition with China – but they’re the politically expedient, popular parts of the solution.
If we’re serious about China as an existential threat to American security and prosperity, we need to start acting like it. Defense spending, which averaged more than 8% of GDP between 1950 and 1970, hit a record low of 3.5% in 2024. According to a report from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, between 2003 and 2007 the United States led China in 60 of 64 critical technologies. By 2023, China led in 57 of those fields. Policymakers are correct that the U.S. faces a Cold War-like threat from China. But they aren’t adopting policies or making financial commitments that align with the urgency of that assessment.
The critical mineral crisis is an excellent microcosm of this dynamic. Although ‘critical mineral’ has become a buzzword in DC-policy circles, recognition hasn’t translated into policy. As of 2024, China was the primary producer of 30 of the 50 materials identified on the U.S. Geological Survey’s critical mineral list. Chinese influence in critical minerals extends into mining, refining, and transportation. These raw materials are essential for manufacturing fighter jets, munitions, tactical equipment, and alloys. In short, these advanced technologies depend on China.
It wasn’t always like this. After World War II, America developed advanced technologies that relied on an increasingly diverse and distant range of suppliers. We did not, however, rely on the Soviet Union for necessary inputs and manufacturing.
China is a very different story. After 1991, national security concerns were swamped by a wave of faith in the transformative power of markets. We were told that integrating China into our trade network and supply chains would make them more like us. It hasn’t. We were told that outsourcing raw material acquisition and manufacturing to China would make America wealthier. By some measures, it has. But reliance on China for critical minerals has made the U.S. uniquely vulnerable to supply chain disruption – intentional or otherwise. For instance, the US relied heavily on China for several minerals that the PRC recently banned exports on: 63 percent of antimony and 50 percent of gallium and germanium imports. Without these minerals, we cannot manufacture key munitions, basic tools like night vision goggles, and more.
We cannot fight a new Cold War with weapons that rely on Chinese goodwill.
Today, the world is now a battleground for leverage over these critical minerals. The Chinese know this – that’s why they’ve invested billions in the Belt and Road Initiative, securing strategic infrastructure and raw material deposits. Rooting out Chinese influence within our critical supply chains will require more than bilateral memorandums of understanding and white papers. America must leverage its fiscal and military power to secure access to essential resources. The last time America faced a great power rival in an existential competition, we used all the tools we could. If this is a new Cold War, we need to adopt the successful strategies of the last one.
One strategy that formed a cornerstone of Cold War strategy was the covert support of strategically-aligned independence groups. Call them rebels, call them secessionists or separatists, if their success gave us an advantage, we took it. Over the course of the Cold War, America supported Kurdish rebels, Tibetan freedom fighters, Indonesian secessionists, and the National Liberation Front of Angola. We recognized that to combat enemy influence across the world, we needed to apply asymmetrical pressure.
Support for separatist and independence movements is just one tool in a larger kit that we should be willing to use. But when it comes to securing access to critical minerals, or threatening Chinese hegemony over certain materials, a willingness to support these groups may be particularly important.
This is due to the political consequences of geography. Within any given region, natural resources tend to be clustered and unevenly distributed. This geological fact frequently results in economic inequality, exploitation, and political instability. In particular, disproportionate natural resources can inspire secessionist movements – both violent and democratic. Similarly, critical minerals typically have precarious supply chains because they are concentrated in one or two countries. These overlapping patterns result in political instability in the areas that produce essential minerals. The U.S. should take advantage of these dynamics and strategically support secessionist movements to two ends. First, support should lead to solidified access to critical resources, either through successful secession or through leverage against the central government. Second, American support for secessionist movements should create pressure against Chinese-owned sources of critical minerals. If China disrupts American access to certain mineral supply chains, our relationships with militias in these countries should offer the option to threaten China’s access to raw materials in turn.
There are numerous examples across the world where this strategy might pay off. From central Africa to the Indo-Pacific, a return to an old element of Cold War strategy and a new willingness to combat Chinese influence by any means possible could cut through the PRC’s web of resource control.
Katanga
The resource-rich region of Katanga, located in the southern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), has its own history of secession. A week after the DRC gained independence in 1960, the southern province of Katanga declared independence and set off an internal conflict. Led by Moise Tshombe, a charismatic politician, and his CONAKAT party, the Katangan secessionist movement had popular support within the province. Endowed with copper, cobalt, gold, uranium, and diamond deposits, the most resource-rich province in the DRC sought greater autonomy and control over its assets. The Katangan independence movement was supported, either covertly or explicitly, by Belgium, Rhodesia, and Congo-Brazzaville. American interests were divided. Some, such as Richard Nixon, Barry Goldwater, and Senator Thomas Dodd, supported the Katangan regime. The Eisenhower administration was however wary of supporting either the Katangans or Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, who sought Soviet aid to end the crisis.
After a coup that led to Lumumba’s death in early 1961, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 161, permitting UN forces to use “all appropriate measures” to end the war. In effect, the UN entered the Katangan crisis on the side of the Congolese government, led by Cyrille Adoula and Joseph Mobutu. The UN mission was enthusiastically supported by the Kennedy administration, with “American Air Force airplanes at this point … coming into Elisabethville, bringing in supplies and troops.” By 1963, the mission succeeded in forcing Tshombe’s resignation and the reintegration of Katanga into the DRC.
Today, tensions remain between the Congolese government and the Katangan people. Katangan resources are more valuable than ever, with copper and cobalt becoming essential for certain batteries, clean energy, and military applications. In 2014, Katangan resources accounted for 67% of total export revenue, which generates a substantial portion of the government budget. In the DRC, the central government is supposed to return 40 percent of national tax revenue to the provinces. By 2014, it returned an average of only 14 percent, meaning that Katanga contributes far more to the central government than it receives. Similarly, the central government has taken steps since 2015 to divide Katangan unity. Under a policy of découpage, the DRC’s eleven provinces were further divided into twenty six. Katanga was split into four parts. While Katanga has been divided by the central government, China has taken steps to cement its control over Katangan resources. Through various agreements and acquisitions, China has established a dominant role in copper and cobalt mining. Of the ten largest cobalt mines, nine are in Katanga. A $6.2 billion mining deal in 2008 gave a Chinese mining consortium rights to tax-exempt copper and cobalt production.
Today, organized secessionary activity is limited, although a rebel group called Mai-Mai Kata Katanga initiated violence between 2011 and 2013 and continues to operate today. American support for a focused Katangan secessionist movement could help overcome China’s dominant position in Congolese cobalt mining.
Balochistan
Balochistan is the largest province in Pakistan by land, although its population is the smallest and poorest in the country. It is located in the western part of the country and borders Iran and Afghanistan. The Baloch people have long sought independence. After Pakistani independence in 1947, a Baloch independence movement resisted integration until 1948. Violence in the 1950s led to the first provincial elections being permitted in Balochistan in 1972. However, the subsequent success of the pro-autonomy National Awami Party in elections resulted in Pakistani President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto removing the democratically-elected government, sparking a four-year violent insurrection. Another round of insurgency that began in 2004 that continues into the present. The Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) has claimed credit for a slew of bombings and ambushes in an intensifying separatist effort. In 2019, the U.S. listed the BLA as a terrorist organization. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has spoken in support of the Balochistan cause during a speech in 2016, raising questions about the possibility of covert Indian aid to the BLA to counter Pakistan.
The rise in violence has also accompanied greater Chinese investment in the region. In 2001, a Chinese-backed effort invested in developing Gwadar, a small coastal village in Balochistan, successfully developing it into a major deep water port. A major component of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the Gwadar port links inland Chinese investments and projects to the sea. In recent years, BLA attacks have targeted Gwadar port, Chinese nationals, and the PRC embassy.
Balochistan also holds substantial critical mineral reserves. In 2002, China leased the Saindak project, which holds about 412 million tons of copper in gold, and has renewed subsequent leases to the present. Balochistan also holds substantial chromite, antimony, and magnesite deposits – all of which were included on the 2022 USGS critical mineral list. While none of these resources are unique to Balochistan, they are nevertheless a source of critical minerals that are increasingly being swept up in China’s larger project of infrastructure, extraction, and mining integration. The U.S. should also be paying careful attention to Chinese investment global antimony supplies – the PRC banned the export of antimony to the U.S. in late 2024.
American support for Baloch separatists could achieve several goals. First, it would disrupt China’s extensive mining and infrastructure investments within Pakistan. It could also pressure the Pakistani government to more carefully balance its alignment towards China and temper hostility functional against the United States.
Myanmar
Myanmar has been in a state of civil war since 2021, when a military junta overthrew Ayung San Suu Kyi, the de facto civilian leader, and arrested many associated with her National League for Democracy (NLD). The coup was met with mass protests, resulting in a violent crackdown on dissent by the ruling junta, known as the Tatmadaw. Fighting broke out all over the country over the course of the next year, as Myanmar drew closer to an all-out civil war. With more than 135 different ethnic groups in Myanmar, conflict with a centralized government involves regional and local interests.
In October 2023, an alliance of ethnic armies known as the Three Brother Coalition launched Operation 1027, an offensive that displaced Tatmadaw forces in the western Shan state. The Three Brother Coalition is composed of the Arakan Army, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, each of which is fighting for greater regional and ethnic autonomy. With more than 10,000 soldiers, the Three Brother Coalition captured numerous towns and villages near the Chinese border.
Functioning essentially as an independent state in the same area, the Wa Self-Administered Division and its army are the most powerful non-central government actors in Myanmar’s civil war. With over 30,000 soldiers, it has at various points worked with the Tatmadaw to solidify its own presence in the Shan state. Positioned on the border, the Wa State has extensive commercial exchanges with China.
China’s role in Myanmar’s conflict has been shaped by its various interests in the country. It does not want to see Myanmar become a failed state, nor handle a surge of refugees. Its commercial interests have led the Chinese government to engage both the rebels and Tatmadaw. Beijing brokered several ceasefires between the militias and government – all of which have failed. The PRC has even offered a billion-dollar aid package to encourage the Tatmadaw to allow elections in 2025.
Myanmar holds substantial rare earth metal deposits, with about 57% of the world’s supply of dysprosium and terbium – both critical minerals – concentrated in the southern Kachin state, near the Chinese border. Between 2005 and 2020, rare earth mining on the Myanmar side of the border grew 130 percent, while Chinese extraction increased by 327 percent. Since the start of the civil war, Chinese imports of heavy rare earth metals from Myanmar have grown 9 times over, providing China with 40% of its rare earth metal supply. Decades of strategic investment have enabled China to achieve a near monopoly in heavy rare earth metals, processing nearly 90 percent of the global supply.
In Myanmar’s civil war, the resource rich regions are up for grabs. In October, the Kachin Independence Army announced the seizure of the critical mining region. As the Tatmadaw loses ground and rebel groups control more and more land, it may benefit the United States to strategically support rebel groups in Myanmar to combat Chinese influence. American-backed militias could even threaten to disrupt Chinese access to a vital source of heavy rare earth elements.
America is Not Prepared to Fight the Next War
The idea of arming and funding rebels and secessionist groups may seem unpalatable to modern policymakers. But we need only reach into the recent past to find numerous examples where these exact tactics were of great value to American interests. .
No doubt there are risks. Policymakers would be correct to identify the risks of funding militias in foreign countries. These groups are frequently, for lack of a better word, bad guys. They fight for causes that we otherwise would not support and use tactics that we would never use ourselves. We share nothing with many of these rebels beyond a mutual interest in overturning the existing order of natural resource ownership and reliance.
Moreover, direct or indirect support would likely strain relations between the U.S. and countries fighting secessionist movements. It is possible that such a policy would damage America’s international reputation and risk ties to unrelated countries that fear foreign meddling in their domestic affairs. Empowering a rebel movement could also increase regional instability, with the possibility of spreading a conflict beyond its initial scope. In Vietnam, we saw how mission creep and support for an independence movement could embroil America in a conflict that stretched far beyond its original intent. Conflict has a gravity of its own, and America has a poor history of being drawn in. Such a policy could even be counterproductive: in resource-rich regions, military efforts to secure minerals could disrupt supply chains in ways that make it more challenging for the US to access critical minerals.
But what option do we have but to consider every option? Yes, support for rebel groups might damage America’s global reputation, but losing a conflict with China would shatter it. Yes, we run the risk of disrupting still-functioning mineral supply chains, but if they remain under Chinese control they will certainly be weaponized against us when the time comes. We no longer have the luxury of keeping our hands clean and working through international institutions that constrain our optionality. If we want America to remain the world’s preeminent military and economic power, we must be willing to fight in a battle that we are already losing.
The fact is that America cannot win a new Cold War while it continues to substantially rely on Chinese suppliers for critical minerals. America should be willing to use every possible strategy and means to achieve greater control over its essential supply chains. Although American policymakers are increasingly comfortable calling our competition with China a “new Cold War,” their hesitance to utilize a full range of options to combat Chinese industrial warfare makes me wonder whether they really understand what is at stake.
The U.S. did not overcome the Soviet threat during the Cold War by sitting idly while the Soviets advanced their interests across the world. We were willing to make difficult trade-offs, leaving no option off the table, because we understood the risk that accompanied growing Soviet influence. Against rising global development and technological equalization, policymakers must similarly recognize that we will have to fight for our economic and political hegemony.
Twenty years of counterinsurgency have not prepared us for great power competition. We weren’t buying critical minerals from the Taliban or Al-Qaeda. To successfully compete with China in the war for the raw materials necessary to build advanced technologies, we need to recognize the nature of the threat. We are starting from behind – Chinese investment in raw material extraction, infrastructure, and processing goes back decades. We will still need to build a parallel network of mines, processors, and factories to decrease our reliance on China. In this respect, supporting strategic separatist interests will not by itself solve the problem – but it will be one critical policy within a broader critical mineral grand strategy. To even have a chance of winning the 21st century, we must be willing to exercise this and other options that may have seemed just a few years ago to be unthinkable.
