The GIGACHAD Approach

Part I: Go West, young mine

American mining companies—and their Canadian, Australian, and South African counterparts—want to mine. These Western mining companies are actively looking to explore and develop new deposits, particularly in the critical minerals space, anywhere in the world that hosts economic deposits. Western miners are not only eager but are also uniquely capable of delivering the minerals that the United States urgently needs for its own economic and security goals.

Western mining firms are the best in the world at mineral exploration, resource modeling, mine engineering, ESG compliance, and community engagement. Recent studies suggest that Western miners are far more capable of developing and successfully operating large mineral deposits than their Chinese counterparts. A 2020 survey by Ericsson, Löf & Löf (Chinese control over African and global mining—past, present and future, 2020) found that “Chinese companies in general lack suitable technical skills to operate large-scale, highly productive mines, let alone in foreign countries with different political, cultural and weather conditions, and on top of this, in an unfamiliar business climate.”

Despite activist narratives to the contrary, local people in mineral-rich, developing nations welcome Western mining companies, preferring them over Chinese or locally run firms. For most communities, a Western mine exploring or building in their neighborhood is a ticket to prosperity. Western miners bring not just capital, but quality jobs, safer workplaces, higher wages, better training programs, and more local infrastructure development. In Mongolia, for instance, workers at the Oyu Tolgoi copper mine—controlled by Rio Tinto—earn salaries and receive benefits that far exceed national averages. In Zambia, Western-run operations like First Quantum’s Sentinel mine have created thousands of high paying jobs and helped fund schools and clinics in remote regions. A 2023 report published in World Development (World Development, 2023) found that Chinese mining companies in Africa tend to pay lower wages and offer fewer worker protections compared to Western firms. In contrast, U.S., Canadianand Australian mining investments are statistically more likely to invest in health, safety, and environmental standards—factors that directly impact workers and their families. It is no coincidence that in survey after survey, local workers and communities express a strong preference for Western employers over Chinese, local private or state-owned alternatives.

Across the globe - from Ghana to Chile to Mongolia - the promise of Western mining is well understood by those on the ground, those closest to the deposits. Local officials want the tax revenues that large mines bring. Local families want stable incomes and jobs. Entrepreneurs want the procurement and tender opportunities that mining projects represent. Reports by the Wilson Center (WC / Examining China’s Impact on Mining in Africa: Critiques and Credible Responses, 2023) and the German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA / At Africa’s Expense? Disaggregating the Social Impact of Chinese Mining Operations, 201) demonstrate that local residents are well aware that they will derive more benefits from American and Western, rather than the Chinese, miners.

So why aren’t Westerners dominating the critical minerals space?

Why, if Western miners are uniquely willing, uniquely capable, and uniquely beneficial to local populations, are they being consistently beaten by their Chinese counterparts in the race for critical minerals?

The answer, can be summed up in one neat, little euphemism – “Country Risk”

Part II: Dealing with Country Risk

What makes or breaks a mining project is not rock—but political will, as is the case with any significant human endeavor. Even if a Western miner has the resolve and means to secure access to a high-quality mineral deposit in a developing jurisdiction and shepherd it profitably to production, that is no guarantee of success. It is very much not “the economy, stupid”. Politics and institutions take preeminence in this domain. The industry term used in this context is “Country Risk”, a polite euphemism which elides a miasma of official red tape and unofficial corruption that swallows Western mining companies whole.

Security of tenure is the first concern that keeps mining investors awake at night. Governments rarely seize foreign-owned mines outright in this day and age - though it is not unheard of, as the recent experiences of the Tenke Fungurume Mine in DRC (2022) and the Kumtor Mine in Kyrgyzstan (2021) show. These days, governments in developing counties utilize subtler, less direct methods to claim control. Consider Mongolia in 2014: Centerra Gold’s new flagship project for the country, the Gatsuurt mine, was delayed for five years by political roadblocks and “popular” protests that were essentially acts of political theater, deliberately instigated by local politicos seeking to expropriate and extract concessions from the company. Several years and many millions of dollars later, in 2018, Centerra was finally forced to exit the country and sell off all of its assets to a nominally “Singaporean consortium” that was in fact a thinly veiled vehicle controlled by the very same politicians who had blocked the mine’s permitting and organized the so called “protests”. The juice was simply not worth the squeeze for Centerra. The Gatsuurt asset languishes in limbo to this day, in the hands of owners unable to raise the capital or manage the level of engineering needed to bring the deposit into production. The experience of Centerra in Mongolia (and also Kyrgyzstan) is unfortunately common for Western miners in emerging and frontier markets. Local oligarchs seldom drive actual innovation, but their ingenuity for fraud and rent seeking behavior is remarkably entrepreneurial

For miners who do manage to retain control of their assets, running the gauntlet of permitting is the second major impediment. Permitting is a purgatory that does not end with permission to mine. Permitting becomes compliance. Compliance, like a diamond from the mines of Kimberly, is forever. Put in the hands of local corruption entrepreneurs, compliance becomes a weapon. Compliance requires dozens, sometimes hundreds of approvals, filings and inspections. Each approval and each inspection is subject to the whims of petty local officials who often demand concessions, both official and unofficial, in exchange for their signature. Laws and standards are changed or selectively enforced to suit the needs of those who hold the rubber stamp. The specifics vary from country to country, but the pattern is remarkably consistent. The agonizing experience of the Dominican Republic’s Pueblo Viejo mine—co‑owned by Barrick and Newmont—is emblematic of this endless cycle. Though it contributes over 2% of national GDP, it has remained under a cloud of uncertainty, not because of any technical failure, but because of the continually shifting politics and environmental policies connected to it.

In Africa and developing Asia, the Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI, 2023) reports widespread demands for bribes from officials—at times disguised as “consultation fees” or “donations” to worthy causes or pet projects—that drive up costs and delay operations. Even NGOs, social media activists, and journalists flock to the lucrative mine feeding trough, leveraging fabricated environmental or social justice agendas to extort companies under the guise of civic campaigns.

Local political forces have an endless array of tools to erode and forcefully extract value from even from the most successful operators. Compulsory indigenous equity is one of the latest innovations in “drinking the milkshake” of the western oil and minerals industry. Pioneered in South Africa and now copied in many other jurisdictions, compulsory indigenous equity creates mandatory ownership requirements for particular ethnic or social groups (or sometimes governments) in mines. These shares are never fairly valued, nor do they come with corresponding capital injections. Rather, they dilute foreign investors and embed a new layer of political exposure into every project. The regulations on compulsory indigenous equity are usually nonsensical because equity has little meaning if it cannot be diluted and shares have little meaning if they cannot be sold but that is hardly the point.

Finally, capital controls erase value even for the few miners who retain control of their assets and successfully maneuver the maze of permitting, threats, bribe requests and equity dilution. Profits mean little if they cannot be moved. In many mineral-rich nations, currency conversion, dividend repatriation, or debt service is blocked or capped. Brazil, South Africa, and India have each experienced waves of investment flight related to capital repatriation limits imposed by their respective governments.

All these pitfalls are systemic, not incidental and they lead to heightened risk in the mining industry. Feasibility studies can model costs, ore grades, and market pricing with varying degrees of certainty. Financial models can predict future cash flows and outline potential multiples. Investors can make predictions based on these models and make reasonably informed decisions on whether to spend capital. But no one cannot predict how a provincial governor might demand a tax renegotiation two years down the line, or how a national election might upend a regulatory regime. These unknowable risks (largely known unknowns) distort investment decisions, discourage transparency, and create vast distortions in the critical minerals supply chain.

Western mining companies are bound by the rule of law. Western firms are subject to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) restrictions, OECD anti-bribery conventions, and reputational scrutiny. They cannot, and will not, grease palms. This integrity should be a strength. But in many regions, it is punished. Rent seeking officials have destroyed billions in long-term value for the sake of a few thousand dollars in bribes by refusing to allow incredibly beneficial projects to proceed unless their pockets are lined. Investors, stung by these experiences, retreat. Reputations harden. And soon, entire jurisdictions become uninvestable—not because their mineral deposits are poor, but because their institutions are.

As the FT noted during Mali’s junta takeover (Financial Times, 2021), the threat of executive detention, contract revision, and forced nationalization turned a large gold-producing country into a “bad jurisdiction,” deterring future Western investments.

Mining companies are uniquely vulnerable to these types of risks because unlike companies in most other industries – tech, agriculture, services, or even real estate - they cannot simply sell their assets or pick up shop and move elsewhere when a particular jurisdiction turns sour. The primary source of value is the deposit itself, not IP, human capital or machinery. This asset is highly illiquid and literally stuck in the ground. Miners must commit huge amounts of capital up front in exchange for an ROI that is many years down the line. Large scale mines require tens if not hundreds of millions of dollars in capital commitments just to get started and mineral projects usually do not even enter production until decades after investment. Compare that to agricultural projects or tech investments where initial investments are typically much smaller -often less than one million dollars - and ROI can be realized in less than 3 years. Miners must gamble big and play the long game. They are forced to make a commitment to the state where their deposit is located.

Unless country risk is addressed, the game is rigged against Western miners. They would be crazy to take all their chips and place it on the ever-turning roulette wheel of a developing mineral jurisdiction. The house (host countries in this case) loses too. Good deposits remain stranded. Communities miss out on jobs, royalties, and infrastructure. Critical minerals drift to players who are less scrupulous and willing to load the dice in their favor.

If the U.S, and its allies do not recognize this fundamental reality and develop strategies to address it, the world’s mineral deposits will continue to drift into China’s control. China has already built up a dominant supply chain in mineral process, particularly of rare earths. Through constant exposure, Chinese firms are also gradually gaining ground in terms of technical know-how and operating talent. The Western mining industry’s competitive advantages are slowly wasting away, repeating the downfall of Western industrial production. Mining is a sector that largely favors patient capital, economies of scale and integrated globalized supply chains. The U.S. and its allies cannot simply go it alone and produce minerals at home or in a small circle of closely allied countries. Autarchy will not work. If the U.S. fails to act now, the next decade will look even worse than the previous in terms of China’s encroaching control of mineral deposits and dominance in the processing field. If they fail to act now, Western leaders may soon wake up to a world where there is no viable alternative to Chinese mining and processing, even for the deposits in their home countries.

Part III: East is East and West is West

The People’s Republic of China has demonstrated a unique capacity to operate effectively in jurisdictions characterized by high levels of “country risk”. China’s success in securing long-term access to critical minerals—cobalt in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), rare earths in Myanmar, lithium in Zimbabwe, and nickel in Indonesia—is not the result of superior technical skills, innovative technology, advanced strategy, local knowledge or a greater appetite for risk. Rather, it reflects a fundamentally different model of engagement that treats corruption and institutional dysfunction not as risks to be mitigated, but as levers to be exploited.

Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and the firms operating parallel to them, secure access to critical minerals through direct and indirect payments to public officials and the cultivation of long-term patronage relationships with ruling elites. The Chinese government also supports Chinese mineral ventures directly, using diplomatic pressure – both carrots and sticks - in a way that Western governments are unwilling to imitate. Chinese mines are backed by substantial diplomatic, financial, and intelligence support. In the DRC, for example, the 2008 Sicomines deal promised $6 billion in infrastructure investments in exchange for mining rights, while also, allegedly, lining the pockets of home-grown elites. A 2023 investigative report by The New York Times and Congo Is Not for Sale (NYT / Congo Is Not for Sale, 2023) revealed that over $1.1 billion in mining revenues were diverted through a Chinese-linked infrastructure, bypassing national accounts and benefiting only a small network of political insiders.

In Myanmar, Chinese mining operations have continued largely uninterrupted despite civil conflict, international sanctions, and widespread human rights abuses. By aligning with military-linked entities and providing financial and logistical support to junta-affiliated actors, Chinese firms have maintained their access to valuable rare earth deposits while evading international scrutiny. Similarly, in Zimbabwe, China’s engagement in lithium and gold mining sectors has proceeded through direct deals with ruling-party elites, often bypassing public procurement processes and environmental due diligence.

The Chinese approach is underpinned by two key differences. Firstly, an explicit willingness to engage in corruption as the cost of doing business. Secondly, the strategic deployment of sovereign power to protect commercial interests abroad. Chinese firms also rely on their country’s strategic dominance in the processing space, a quai-monopsony in the case of rare earths. In effect, China does not reduce country risk—it feeds upon it. It eliminates local resistance through coercion, co-optation, and surveillance, and it treats informal payments to regulators, journalists, and civil society actors as routine operating expenses.

Western governments must recognize that their firms are being systematically outcompeted not because of inefficiency, or incompetence but because the rules are broken.

So should the West copy China’s approach? Absolutely not. Attempts by Western firms and governments to replicate corrupt tactics would not only fail. When it comes to corruption, Chinese entities have a level of experience and institutional alignment with the state that the West cannot hope to replicate, much less surpass. Moreover, they would discredit the liberal democratic model that gives the West one of its few remaining advantages. The West cannot beat China at its own game.

The competitive response, therefore, cannot and must not be imitation of China’s willingness to engage in corruption. The West can and should emulate China’s strategic use of sovereign power in pursuit of minerals but it must channel this sovereign power in a way that plays to the West’s strengths. The West’s competitive advantage lies not in corruption, but in building institutions and clear rules that provide stability, legitimacy, and long-term prosperity. The institutions of post-war period — NATO, the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Trade Organization (WTO) — though imperfect and now in need of a complete overhaul, served the goals of Western prosperity and ascendency for more than 50 years. The West can also look to its colonial past to find examples of institutions that were even more successful at imposing order and opening commercial access in a multipolar world, particular in regions with great “country risk”. The British East India Company, for example, was an incredibly successful company that operated for nearly 300 years as a quasi-sovereign entity, wielding both commercial and regulatory power in foreign territories. These Western institutions endured for so long and were so influential not because they fostered corruption in colonized nations, but because they provided a framework for predictable, rules-based interaction across national systems. The West can draw inspiration from these past successes to face future challenges. Institutions still matter and no one has a stronger track record building functional institutions than the Western powers.

To reclaim the strategic ground in high-risk mining jurisdictions, the United States and its allies must utilize an institutional approach and offer credible alternatives to Chinese infrastructure and mining deals.

Part IV: A Modest Proposal

The current global framework for resource investment is not merely inefficient but completely unworkable for Western firms. The only way to make these environments viable is to change the terms of engagement entirely. This paper proposes a bilateral institution-based solution to further Western access to critical minerals in high-risk mining jurisdictions. The Geostrategic Initiative to Guarantee Access to Critical Hard Assets and Democratization (GIGACHAD) is a novel approach that leverages U.S. assistance and market access to force states in these jurisdictions to surrender a level of their sovereignty over their mineral resources. Under the general GIGACHAD framework, countries that wish to attract U.S. backed mining and infrastructure investment must sign a bilateral CHAD Agreement, in which they make enforceable commitments in exchange for continued access to U.S. economic, military and diplomatic resources. States that sign on receive investment into their mining projects, trade access, and development aid as well as military assistance. Those who do not agree or choose to align with China instead will face higher tariffs, visa restrictions, reduced financial access, reduced aid across the board, and strategic isolation.

At the heart of the framework is a joint CHAD Investment Protection Council. This is a standing, bilateral authority composed of U.S. appointed officials, Western industry representatives and senior representatives of the host government approved by the U.S. The CHAD Council is formed after a CHAD Agreement is signed. Each council has a slightly different composition and a unique suite of authorities and powers tailored to local conditions but all councils exercise exclusive regulatory jurisdiction over all qualifying mining and mineral infrastructure projects in their territory. National regulators—ministries, agencies and departments—and sub-national officials—governors, mayors, provincial governments—have no direct, independent authority over projects operating under a CHAD Agreement. They may not impose taxes, grant or withhold permits, levy fee or fines, inspect sites, or demand compliance outside the authority of the CHAD Council. They are required to recuse themselves from public comment or media pieces on CHAD related projects. If they wish to participate in or comment upon a given project, they must do so through the CHAD Council structure.

The CHAD council will not be a paper tiger. The Council will be fully staffed, granted an independent budget, and empowered to take immediate action when interference with a mining project occurs. The CHAD council will have broad authority to establish rules, regulations and procedures for mining projects that fall under its authority. When a company operating a project under the GIGACHAD framework is approached by a local official demanding a bribe, imposing an unapproved fee, or threatening regulatory or media obstruction, that company does not negotiate. It reports the incident directly to the local CHAD Council. The Council then summons the relevant official and initiates an investigation, backed by the authority of both the host government and the U.S. mission.

The Council has the power to:

• Establish rules, regulations and procedures for mining projects

• Incorporate and maintain its own independent judiciary and police forces. In certain jurisdictions, where states are weak or conflict is prevalent, a military contingent may also be necessary.

• Issue judgements and enforce rulings regarding disputes (civil, administrative and criminal) related to the mineral extraction and processing sectors.

• Suspend the involvement of offending local officials and individuals in mineral project-related matters;

• Issue and enforce legal or administrative sanctions against those who attempt to interfere in mineral project, including to elected or appointed officials of the host government;

• Deploy U.S. diplomatic channels to demand accountability at the national level if the host government fails to cooperate and act in accordance with its agreements.

• Publicly certify and escalate any disputes or controversies in its area of jurisdiction, triggering consequences such as reduced or suspended aid, the interruption of trade privileges, tariffs, visa restrictions, financial access, foreign asset seizure, sanctions, and media naming and shaming.

The company or companies operating deposits supervised by the CHAD Council are insulated from retaliation. The Council is the face of enforcement, not the investor. This ensures that firms are not left to navigate corrupt environments alone.

In exchange for this protection, companies must comply with the obligations of the framework: pay taxes and royalties as defined in the treaty, honor their local development commitments, and report fully and promptly any attempts at interference or corruption. The integrity of GIGACHAD depends on both sides playing by the rules and reporting when others do not.

Projects operating under GIGACHAD benefit from a predictable investment environment, regulatory and fiscal stability, predictable permitting timelines, streamlined oversight, and preferential access to U.S. markets.

The host nations, and their governments, in turn, gain credibility, robust capital influx, jobs and opportunities for local workers, trade and via privileges, as well increased and uninterrupted flow of US assistance as well as a trusted channel for engagement with the U.S. government and private sector. The U.S. must be careful to avoid using the GIGACHAD framework to bully nations, particularly the developing nations, that sign up to a CHAD agreement. GIGACHAD must dangle a large carrot and be seen as an opportunity rather than an obligation. The benefits of joining must be made clear and overwhelming.

But these benefits are conditional. Violation of the agreement by the host country—or by regional actors that fall under its jurisdiction—can result in immediate suspension of benefits, removal of project protection, and broader consequences for bilateral relations. This is not an advisory forum. GIGACHAD must speak loudly and carry a stick as large as its carrot.

GIGACHAD functions as a strategic application of the theory of the second best, which holds that when one unavoidable distortion exists in a market—such as entrenched institutional corruption—introducing a second, deliberate distortion, such as government-backed regulatory intervention, may improve overall efficiency. In this case, rather than attempting to enforce idealized market conditions in fundamentally flawed jurisdictions, GIGACHAD introduces a structured, treaty-based governance layer that corrects for the failures of the host state.

GIGACHAD and the CHAD Councils operating under it, must have teeth. They must have power and independent funding. They must have the ability and the political will to fiercely and vigorously defend their limited and specific mandate. CHAD councils must case aside antiquated nations of “participation” and “local ownership” that dominated the conversation surrounding Western intervention during the USAID era. GIGACHAD must be laser focused on a singular outcome and avoid mission creep. There is no soft version of GIGACHAD that is worth exploring. Half measures at outsourced sovereignty will fail, as experience shows.

A Lesson for CHADS: How the Commission Against Impunity Fell Apart When it Confronted Impunity

The International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) was created in 2007 through an unprecedented agreement between the United Nations and the Guatemalan government. The idea was unique – rather than being a foreign aid program or a domestic anti-corruption unit, CICIG was a hybrid international–national body with the legal authority to investigate, build criminal cases, and support prosecutions against entrenched organized crime and corruption networks embedded in government. The CICIG was meant to remain independent of the Guatemalan state. Funded primarily by international donors (including the United States and the European Union), CICIG was designed to fill the vacuum where domestic institutions had failed. Under the leadership of commissioners like Iván Velásquez, and supported by reformist diplomats such as U.S. Ambassador Todd Robinson, CICIG achieved historic successes: most notably, the exposure of the La Línea customs fraud network in 2015, which forced the resignation and prosecution of the sitting president (Otto Pérez Molina) and vice president (Roxana Baldetti), alongside hundreds of other convictions that targeted judges, legislators, and military officers. For over a decade, CICIG became a symbol of hope, showing that ceding limited sovereignty in areas where local states are systematically compromised can produce extraordinary gains for citizens and the rule of law—precisely the type of sovereignty-sharing experiment envisioned in the GIGACHAD framework.

Yet CICIG’s ultimate fate also underscored the risks of half measures. Ultimately, it was President Jimmy Morales—himself under CICIG investigation for illegal campaign financing—who dismantled the Commission. He did shield his own network and maintain his own impunity. The CICIG proves that internationally-backed anti-corruption bodies can work and overcome “Country Risk” but only if they are strong, independent, focused and shielded from local elite capture.

Part V: A Tale of Three CHADS

For GIGACHAD to gain legitimacy, it must be implemented—successfully and visibly—in jurisdictions where its effects are both meaningful and measurable. These early test cases will serve as precedents, persuading miners and host governments that a better model exists.

The remainder of this paper will elaborate upon how the GIGACHAD framework might play out in three very different jurisdictions - Ghana, Mongolia and Myanmar - all with varying mineral resource endowments and differing relationships with China:

Ghana

Ghana offers a broad array of excellent mineral deposits and a relatively weak but rapidly growing Chinese presence. It is one of the strongest mining economies in West Africa, host to substantial gold, bauxite, and manganese deposits. It is home to AngloGold Ashanti’s Obuasi and Iduapriem mines, as well as Newmont’s Ahafo and Akyem projects—assets that have collectively contributed billions to the Ghanaian economy. Ghana has long enjoyed a reputation as a relatively stable and democratic state. Yet in recent years, the investment landscape has become increasingly uneven. Ghana’s 2023 Minerals Income Investment Fund reforms, while aimed at national development, have raised questions about the transparency and independence of state-linked mining entities. Permitting delays, shifting tax regimes, and intensified pressure for local equity participation resulting from these reforms have frustrated Western firms. Chinese influence has grown hand in hand with this blossoming country risk. China has gained a foothold in Ghana via infrastructure-for-minerals deals with the government and opaque joint ventures that blur the line between public benefit and elite capture.

This drift is neither inevitable nor irreversible. Ghana remains deeply engaged with multilateral institutions and still views the U.S. as its main strategic partner, both economically and diplomatically. GIGACHAD would allow the United States to anchor that partnership in hard infrastructure and governance reform. By establishing a CHAD Agreement with Ghana, the U.S. could offer a clear reason to steer the country away from Chinese influence. The CHAD Investment Protection Council would streamline permitting and insulate Western-backed mining projects from interference, rent-seeking, and ad hoc regulatory changes.

For the U.S., Ghana is a credible partner with established institutions and limited but growing Chinese influence—making it a strong candidate for a high-visibility success story.

Mongolia

Mongolia represents a challenge at the other end of the spectrum from Ghana – mineral resources are rich and diverse but Chinese influence is also pervasive. Though blessed with rich deposits of copper, coal, and rare earth elements, Mongolia is overwhelmingly dependent on China for trade, logistics, and capital. This dependence is neither comfortable nor popular. Successive Mongolian governments have publicly reaffirmed the country’s “third neighbor” policy, an explicit strategy to counterbalance Chinese and Russian influence in the country by deepening ties with the United States, Japan, South Korea, and Europe. Expropriation, endless permitting obstacles, and frequent interference by local power centers have stranded some of Mongolia’s most valuable deposits, despite vocal support for foreign investment from both politicians and the populace. Western media is saturated with stories of these mining misadventures. Meanwhile, Chinese firms operate quietly, spreading influence under the radar, with massive state backed projects that are rarely mentioned by the media.

GIGACHAD would allow Mongolia to finally and fully realize its third neighbor policy and simultaneously develop its mineral sector. With a single bilateral agreement, Mongolia could gain access to U.S. trade preferences, development finance, and diplomatic backing. It would also provide Western firms with the legal certainty and political shielding they need to invest.

Unfortunately, any Mongolian government that signs onto GIGACHAD will be taking a calculated risk, however. A public commitment to GIGACHAD would be seen in Beijing as an act of strategic defiance, and China may respond by threatening to withdraw investment, restrict cross-border trade, or apply pressure through infrastructure dependencies (power, railroad and road ports, airspace, etc). These are not hypothetical tools—they are well-worn levers of economic influence that China has used on Mongolia in the past. If the U.S wishes to make GIGACHAD viable in Mongolia, it must be prepared for the Chinese reaction. That means bringing sufficient economic resources to the table—whether through development finance, private capital mobilization, or direct guarantees—to outmatch whatever China may choose to withhold. Mongolia will only move on GIGACHAD if it believes that the U.S. will stand behind its commitments with real money and political resolve. Even then, it will be a challenge, as borders cannot be shifted as easily as treaties.

Fortunately, Mongolia’s economy is small—its GDP is roughly $20 billion. A successful GIGACHAD deployment would cost the United States relatively little in terms of its own budget power. A relatively modest investment here would be enough to swamp out the Chinese but the strategic relevance would be gigantic. Success here on China’s border, in the birthplace of the Yuan dyanasty, would be a parallel to the USSR’s engagement with Cuba during the Cold War. Success here would provide a case study in how modest U.S. engagement, structured around enforceable rules and mutual accountability, can unlock strategic minerals, reduce risk, and outmaneuver China.

Myanmar & Kachin State

The third and perhaps most compelling candidate for early implementation of GIGACHAD is Myanmar. Myanmar presents a radically different challenge for the GIGACHAD framework. Unlike Ghana or Mongolia, the state does not command the full extent of its territory in Myanmar. According to field assessments, the junta in Naypyidaw exercises meaningful authority over perhaps a fifth of the country’s landmass, with the balance administered by an array of ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) (BBC, Dec 2024).

In Kachin State, the KIA is the de facto government, operating its own courts, taxation systems, and armed forces. The balance of power shifted away from the junta in late 2024. In a series of rapid offensives, the KIA seized the strategic towns of Chipwi and Pangwa, consolidating physical control the territory that hosts the crown jewel of critical mineral deposits, the Pangwa–Kanpaiti (PK) rare earth belt. By some estimates, the PK belt represents the single most important source of heavy rare earth elements (HREEs) in the entire global supply chain. Between 2017 and 2024, Myanmar exported more than 290,000 tons of rare earth materials to China, valued at over $4.2 billion. The vast majority of these materials originated in the PK belt.

The KIA’s recent disruption of this flow of minerals reverberated through the global market. Chinese imports of heavy rare earth feedstock plunged by nearly 90% in February 2025, driving a surge in global prices and exposing Beijing’s reliance on this volatile frontier supply chain. “The KIA,” one analyst told Reuters, “is trying to use rare earth reserves as leverage—this is as much about politics as it is about resources.” (Reuters, Mar 2025)

A CHAD Agreement executed in Myanmar could swing the pendulum of the critical minerals race back toward the West with a single stroke of the pen, while also bringing the promise of eventual peace and prosperity to a war-torn and environmentally degraded populace.

For a CHAD agreement to work in Myanmar, the approach would have to include military and peace-keeping elements. Unlike Mongolia or Ghana, there is no single sovereign counterpart with the uncontested authority to outsource operational control. A credible framework must involve agreements with both the junta in Naypyidaw and the KIA in Myitkyina, each ceding partial authority over the supply chain and the resource zone in exchange for economic and security guarantees from the U.S. GIGACHAD should prioritize overtures to the junta, as the recognized government authority, first but the KIA must also eventually be brought into a CHAD agreement or the intervention will lack legitimacy. CHAD could even serve as a forum and framework for eventual peace talks between the junta, the KIA and other groups.

The CHAD council in Myanmar would need to oversee concessions and extraction, enforce safety standards, and—critically—deploy its own security apparatus to protect sites and transit corridors. GIGACHAD in Myanmar will hearken back to the quasi-sovereign roles played by chartered companies in the colonial era, albeit under twenty-first-century governance and transparency norms.

The GIGACHAD model would achieve three strategic objectives in Myanmar. First, it would stabilize supply and professionalize operations, transforming what is now a chaotic, and dangerous frontier into a reliable ally in the Western critical minerals ecosystem. Second, it would impose the skeleton of a peace deal on a conflict zone, institutionalizing cooperation between the KIA and the junta through shared participation in the revenue and governance structure. And third, it would deprive Beijing of the leverage it has long exercised over Myanmar’s rare earth frontier, repositioning that leverage in the hands of the U.S. and Western powers.

This will not be a simple exercise, but it should be a straightforward one. The CHAD Agreement will need to establish clear commercial and legal grounds for safe and reliable mineral exploitation, then deploy credible force to impose the required conditions. The temptation toward mission creep, to turning the Myanmar CHAD agreement into another nation building exercise like those carried out in Iraq, Afghanistan or Vietnam, will be strong. The CHAD council and all its members must resist this temptation and be clear that they are in Myanmar not to win hearts and minds or impose western values of democracy, but simply to extract rare earths. The U.S. has a poor record winning hearts and minds in SE Asia but great success at commercial cooperation. The unique combination of a clear mandate backed by commercial acumen, security enforcement, and political neutrality is what makes GIGACHAD uniquely suited to succeed in Myanmar where other interventions have failed.

Part VI: Conclusion

“A good example is the best sermon” – Benjamin Franklin

“A good plan violently executed now is better than a perfect plan executed next week.” – Gen. George S. Patton.

This paper has outlined the key reasons why Western mining companies have fallen behind their Chinese counterparts in the race for critical minerals in developing and frontier markets. It has also proposed a novel policy mechanism for leveling the playing field and allowing Western miners to compete in these territories. It has furthermore examined how the proposed GIGACHAD framework would likely play out in three different jurisdictions.

The authors could easily have selected other jurisdictions where the conditions may be more or less suitable. GIGACHAD only needs to show mining companies and host governments a few successful case studies to gain momentum. The results will speak for themselves and both firms and states will flock to seek the benefits of the framework, unlocking the value of deposits previously stranded in the physical and political wilderness. The West can potentially make up for decades of lost time in building their critical minerals pipeline using the GIGACHAD approach.

The Trump administration should immediately develop a unified U.S. government framework and empower an agency, staffed with credible industry experts, to implement the GIGACHAD approach to promoting mineral development. While this framework is being put in place, the administration should begin pushing in parallel for the conclusion of the first CHAD Agreement, in a jurisdiction that could be considered low hanging fruit - a state that is already aligned with the U.S. and where China has limited influence (e.g. Ukraine, Greenland, Ghana, select Latin American states).

The success of this initial deal (or deals) should then be leveraged to push a CHAD Agreement in a more challenging jurisdiction – a state more loosely aligned with the U.S., where China has more influence (e.g. Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Myanmar).