In 2048, any Consultative Party of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty may request a review conference to discuss the operation of the Madrid Protocol, a legal instrument of the treaty which includes a strict ban on mining. China has expanded from 2 to 5 Antarctic research stations since 2009, as well as developing dual-use infrastructure in the region. Should China, or any other power, decide to push for mining rights in the Antarctic by disregarding or garnering enough support to amend the terms of the Madrid Protocol, Britain could find itself in a position where it is neither able to contest rival actions nor exploit its own claims in the region.
Britain has a limited presence in the South Atlantic with no deep-water ports in its mid-Atlantic British Overseas Territories (BOTs), no infrastructure chain to Antarctica, and a limited capability to support its territories in the Southern Atlantic should they be contested. Infrastructure built between 2026-2045 will determine Britain’s negotiating position in 2048. The decision window is closing.
As a founding signatory to the Antarctic Treaty and a sovereign claimant to Antarctic territory, Britain currently enjoys a privileged status in the governance of the southern continent. It has benefitted from the scientific research conducted at its polar stations and birthed the technological innovations required to maintain a permanent presence in the region. But the status quo will not last. As others look to project greater influence in Antarctica, Britain must adapt to preserve its access to the region and defend its sovereign claims.
A Solution: Commercial Dual-Use Infrastructure
In 1920 the English Bay Company was granted a concession on Ascension Island by the Admiralty to extract guano, a ‘critical material’ of the day prized as an efficient natural fertiliser due to its high phosphate and nitrate content. While the fortunes of the company fluctuated over the course of two decades ending in commercial failure, the venture produced tangible infrastructure investment: housing, equipment, harbour improvements, and transport links, all built with private capital under public licence.
We could do this again. The current fiscal situation in Britain means that large-scale public-sector investment in defence capabilities in the Southern Atlantic remains unlikely for the foreseeable future. However, encouraging private commercial ventures on the BOTs could enable the development of critical infrastructure with dual-use applications.
Dual-use examples of infrastructure include maritime facilities such as ports and port handling equipment, housing and storage; transport and shipping capabilities that can be used for naval replenishment and maritime patrol; and communications networks for surveillance.
By encouraging private ventures, Britain may be able to create a durable South Atlantic infrastructure network by 2048, which will strengthen its position during Antarctic negotiations and could be used to help enforce territorial claims depending on the existing geopolitical environment. Without this, Britain risks being shut out of the Antarctic, dependent on diplomatic entreaties and lacking hard power assets to meaningfully back up its position or claims.
As a secondary benefit, the opening of the BOTs to research and commercial activities may grant Britain access to high-demand natural resources such as critical minerals, oil and gas, as well as novel ways of extracting them. Though success is by no means guaranteed. Designing a highly permissive regulatory environment in the territories will allow innovators to experiment in creating the durable mining and logistical infrastructure that will be needed for the eventual exploration and extraction of resources in Antarctica proper.
The race is on. China continues to grow its presence in Antarctica, constructing facilities with dual-use technologies that could be used for military purposes. The US DoD suggests that China’s Qinling research station, established in 2024, could provide the PLA with improved surveillance capabilities due the telemetry, track, and communications functions hosted at the base. Recent Chinese polar icebreaker expeditions have proven capable of transporting hundreds of personnel and enough supplies to support over one-hundred days of inland Antarctic exploration. These capabilities could easily be repurposed to support military logistical needs.
Territorial Prioritisation
Of the five BOTs, three emerge as priorities for development.
The Falkland Islands
The Falkland Islands present the most immediately actionable territory across the region, given that it already hosts significant defence infrastructure. The Mount Pleasant Complex provides one of the longest military runways in the southern hemisphere, and Stanley Harbour offers deep-water berthing that has supported Royal Navy deployments since 1982. The Islands’ proximity to both the Patagonian shelf and the Antarctic Peninsula approach routes gives them strategic relevance across a range of Southern Ocean conflict scenarios.
In stark contrast to successive British governments’ failure to exploit the abundant natural resources bequeathed by God to the United Kingdom, the Falkland Islands Government is actively pursuing offshore oil exploration in its Exclusive Economic Zone. Estimates of recoverable reserves have ranged up to 500 million barrels of oil in the most prospective formations, and as such there exists a strong commercial rationale for investing in infrastructure upgrades to allow for resource extraction.
Unlike several of the Southern Atlantic BOTs with no permanent populations, it is more difficult for London to compel the Falklands Islands Government (FIG) to take specific policy choices due to the high degree of local self-government. However given the FIG’s interest in oil exploration and gold mining, and its dependence on London for defence, it would be conducive to all parties to proceed with a mineral licencing regime in the future that would require infrastructure to be designed with British defence requirements in mind.
Commercially driven activity brings with it investment in infrastructure that allows Britain to project influence without bearing the brunt of the costs. In addition to the creation of offshore drilling platforms, increases in supply vessel traffic improves maritime domain awareness in the region, while expanded logistics and housing facilities in Stanley raise the island’s capacity to host military personnel and materiel. Additionally, successful commercial activity may help finance public projects via taxes or royalites, such as the FIG’s investment in new port facilities.
Ascension Island
Ascension Island combines an existing airfield and communications infrastructure with proximity to both Atlantic shipping lanes and the South Atlantic approach corridor. Its mid-Atlantic position means that upgrades there have value across multiple regional scenarios, not only Antarctic ones.
In 2024, a collaborative research project pioneered at Oxford University launched to investigate the recovery of rare earth elements (REEs) from volcanic sedimentary rocks on Ascension. As the West seeks to break China’s stranglehold on critical mineral supply chains, enabling critical mineral research and commercial ventures in the Southern Atlantic territories could provide Britain with potential dual-use infrastructure and an alternative source of valuable natural resources. Since 2024, the Ascension Island project has evolved from a research study to a spin-out company, Ascension Earth Resources, which has developed a proprietary method for mineral extraction based on geothermal heat. While this itself is a success with benefits for the British economy, it should inspire future activities that enable the creation of more permanent infrastructure on Ascension capable of serving dual-use purposes. This could be achieved by permitting the extraction of REEs on the island.
Ascension Island hosts RAF Ascension Island/Wideawake Airfield, jointly operated by the RAF and United States Space Force under a bilateral agreement, which serves as the essential mid-Atlantic refuelling stop on the South Atlantic Air Bridge. The airfield supports a joint signals intelligence facility, and Space Force tracking stations supporting Cape Canaveral launches.
The island has no deep-water port capable of supporting sustained naval operations or offshore logistics, meaning that while the air infrastructure is well-established, the maritime gap remains deficient for any strategy requiring forward naval presence or resource extraction support. Encouraging a permissive regulatory sandbox would allow private ventures to build the infrastructure alternatives that may bridge this deficiency. For example, remote and autonomous shipping technology that can operate in small harbours to transport mineral payloads could be repurposed to transfer military supplies. Shore-to-ship cargo deliveries by drones could be scaled in locations where expanding port facilities is unfeasible and would provide dual-use benefits such as being capable of naval resupply.
South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands
South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands combine proximity to the Antarctic Peninsula with an established British Antarctic Survey presence on the island of South Georgia, which hosts research stations at King Edward Point and Bird Island. These provide political and logistical cover for expanding operations to collect signals intelligence in the region. The island’s fjord geography also offers natural deep-water anchorage that would require less of an engineering investment to make operationally available for stationing naval and autonomous naval assets.
St Helena and Tristan da Cunha
This leaves St Helena, which hosts no military infrastructure, and Tristan da Cunha, whose extreme remoteness makes it expensive to develop. Together, however, the BOTs form a series of stepping stones in the South Atlantic, forming a chain of islands situated less than 2000 nautical miles from one another, within the maximum range of autonomous surface vessels currently in development. This means that if the construction of transport of conventional airstrips and harbours proves commercially challenging on territories such as Tristan da Cunha, it could still serve as an intermediate supply depot. Britain should nevertheless still encourage logistics enterprises to make use of the islands, operating a regulatory sandbox model that seeks to capture the benefits accrued through technological innovation and infrastructure development.
The Regulatory Framework
Britain’s ability to develop strategic infrastructure across its South Atlantic territories is constrained by its challenging fiscal outlook and the accumulation of environmental and regulatory protections that have been layered onto these territories over the past two decades. Any concession model will need to address these issues to incentivise private enterprise activity across the BOTs.
The most significant obstacle is that some territories have a designated Terrestrial Protected Area (TPA) and Marine Protected Area (MPA). The South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands MPA was designated in 2012 and extended to approximately 1.24 million square kilometres in 2025, while its TPA extends to the entire landmass. These impose restrictions on extractive activity across the territory making any mineral or hydrocarbon concession impossible. The designations were made under the Marine and Coastal Access Act and Wildlife and Protected Areas Ordinance respectively. Reversing or amending these regulations would require the Government to pass new primary legislation.
A similar obstacle exists on Ascension Island, with its MPA currently constraining infrastructure development and preventing resource extraction. This doesn’t apply to The Falklands, where the FIG takes a proactive approach to mining, and the Foreign Office should make it policy to support this approach across the BOTs.
The broader Overseas Territories environmental legislative framework was designed primarily for conservation purposes. Ascension Island’s conservation ordinances, the Tristan da Cunha’s marine management provisions, and the various species protection instruments applying across the BOTs impose legal risks that currently make commercial ventures challenging, if not impossible.
The short-term legislative agenda must therefore revolve around creating a permissive environment that allows for commercial activity and infrastructure development on the territories. An Act of Parliament will be required to scrap the SGSSI-MPA and TPA. A review of Southern Overseas Territories environmental legislation in the territories with no permanent settled populations (Ascension, and South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands), would likely still be required to find a compromise between creating viable permitting conditions and ensuring certain environmental protections exist for the unique flora and fauna that exist in the region. This should be prioritised, with lessons applied to the territories with settled populations such as the Falklands where local consent is realistically required from a political, if not constitutional standpoint.
A revised permitting framework for BOT infrastructure development could also include a national interest override mechanism, allowing the Secretary of State to direct approval of projects where the public interest in development outweighs the conservation case against it. Best practice might be taken from Western Australia and Alberta, which have been better at balancing favourable permitting conditions with maintaining some level of environmental protection.
In addition to permissibility, the British government must create the contractual architecture within which commercial concessions should be issued through new primary legislation. While this needs to be liberal enough to attract private ventures, sovereign protection should be considered from the outset.
Given the dual-use goals of the programme, concession applicants will need to be screened on national security grounds. An advanced version of the investment screening powers introduced under the National Security and Investment Act 2021 could work for BOTs providing the emphasis was on pre-investment screening, giving the Secretary of State the explicit authority to refuse or revoke a concession on national security grounds without triggering compensation liability. This would also require all concession applicants above a defined threshold to disclose ultimate beneficial ownership, state connections, and any existing relationships with foreign governments or their proxies.
For commercial ventures focused on mineral extraction, the government should implement a right of first refusal on extracted resources, as a standard condition. This provision would require the concession holder to notify the relevant Secretary of State before entering any offtake agreement with a third party and would give the government a defined window to elect to purchase the relevant output at the same price and on the same terms as the proposed third party agreement. This would allow the government to purchase critical minerals as necessary, and prevent situations in which a British-licensed extraction operation sells its entire output to a Chinese buyer under long-term offtake contracts, effectively transferring the strategic benefit of British territorial resources to an adversary.
Keeping in mind the intention to create a series of stepping stones towards the Antarctic, enterprises should be encouraged to develop logistics and transport networks between the islands. This could be achieved by bundling concessions or even offering favourable terms to projects looking to develop this specific capability.
The Infrastructural Task
In addition to creating a favourable regulatory environment, the government would provide a strong signal of commitment by encouraging the necessary prerequisites to commercial resource extraction. Building on the Oxford-led research into Ascension Island’s geothermal energy potential and rare earth element deposits, the government should permit a venture to proceed with critical mineral extraction on Ascension Island. The MoD could then model the dual use applications of any infrastructure developed on the island for the purposes of mining/logistics, influencing future infrastructure design to accommodate military requirements.
Simultaneously, a mapping exercise will need to be undertaken across the BOTs to establish baseline infrastructure and military operational needs. Significant energy will have to be devoted to coordinating cross-departmental responsibilities, given the MoD responsibility for basing requirements, and Foreign Office management of territorial governance. Given the latter’s ability to consistently undermine British sovereignty with respect to its Overseas Territories, as recently demonstrated through debacles in Diego Garcia and Gibraltar, its role should be kept to a minimum.
A Ministry of Defence-led assessment could cover existing infrastructure at each territory; what a sustained forward presence would require; and a preliminary prioritisation assessment identifying which infrastructure investments deliver value across both dimensions. Ascension and the Falklands will likely emerge as priorities from this exercise, but an assessment would be required as programmes become more feasible across the remaining territories in the region. This should be conducted with the permissive sandbox perspective in mind, with the idea that commercial logistics and infrastructure can be adapted to suit military requirements.
As this is an area where British and American interests significantly overlap, it would make sense for Britain to approach US counterparts on cost-sharing arrangements where private capital is unable to meet all the upfront costs. The existing bilateral relationship on Ascension, where American capital funded the most recent runway resurfacing and American personnel constitute a substantial proportion of the island’s operational workforce shows that the US has an established appetite for investment in South Atlantic infrastructure when there is a strategic rationale for doing so. As American supply chain policy is being restructured around critical minerals security, Washington is likely to be receptive to British BOT development which generates rare earth element supply chains that reduce dependence on Chinese-controlled sources. American co-investment in the infrastructure that enables that development is a direct contribution to US security in the South Atlantic, given the high levels of defence integration between the two countries and the high chance that the US would request the use of British defence facilities in the event of conflict in the South Atlantic.
The Ten Year Sprint
By 2036, the strategic objective is a functioning infrastructure chain across the priority BOTs that changes Britain’s operational position in the Southern Ocean from nominal to real. The specific capabilities that should be operational at this point are:
- an upgraded deep-water berth at Cumberland Bay (SGSSI) capable of supporting Type 26-class or equivalent vessels, which the island’s historical maritime operations suggest is feasible.
- expanded airstrip capacity at Ascension supporting sustained C-17 or equivalent heavy transport operations, which require expanded fuel storage facilities.
- hardened communications infrastructure across Ascension and SGSSI providing secure bandwidth for both commercial and military use.
- Facilities to support autonomous naval vessels in Mare Harbour (Falklands)
- the deployment of autonomous surface vessels and drones for logistics and surveillance around BOT waters.
But achieving this requires a concession design that makes sure provisions are commercially attractive. Balancing economic and security concerns alongside minimum environmental standards will be challenging. The FIG granting of oil licences shows that South Atlantic resource prospects can compete for private capital when the offer is structured correctly.
Preserving the British Foothold
Britain’s position in the South Atlantic is one of stasis, with geopolitical conditions steadily moving against its favour. As the Chinese increase their footprint on the southern continent, the durability of the Antarctic Treaty becomes less certain, making sweeping treaty revisions more likely in 2048. Britain does not have the resources to commit to large-scale security infrastructure development across the region to defend its interests and Antarctic claims, so must look to do so via other means.
By leaning on commercial ventures willing to shoulder risk and upfront costs, Britain can oversee the development of dual-use infrastructure across its Overseas Territories in the South Atlantic, enabling power projection at a fraction of the cost.
Britain built its position in the South Atlantic through the accumulated effect of commercial ventures, naval deployments, and enterprise operating under Crown licence. Irrespective of the success of individual endeavours, these combined efforts contributed to the generation of new infrastructure, technological advancements, and a greater established British presence. This tried and tested model can be employed once more to great effect.
