Introduction
This essay argues that Latin America’s global lead in Christian adherence causes the principles of “America First” to align powerfully with the priorities articulated by the Trump Corollary. This dynamic helps ensure that the principle of “enlist and expand” works to rebuff China’s asymmetric strategy of mass spiritual and psychological attack, a dominant vector for turning the American people into their nation’s weakest link. And it helps aim US grand strategy away from costly entanglements in the unstable politics of de-Christianizing parts of the West such as those in Europe. Notably, the approach put forth in this essay is well understood as expressing a robust logical and conceptual update of the soft power theory of international order and the international reordering it makes possible under innovative and assertive forms of policy entrepreneurship reflective of transformative events in transitional times. In this sense, the strategic movement described herein—away from the smart power modus operandi of matured neoliberalism toward what the essay terms a spiritual capacity model of state-sponsored cognitive security at scale—promises to achieve for the administration the kind of acceptable and fruitful world system stability that previously successful master strategic concepts sustained for American leaders in eras past.
The argument starts from the global realignment of Christian practice away from the Old World West toward the southerly New World. While this momentous change is most often decried as a symptom of European decline and/or of the sociopolitical third-worldization of the Church, two serious problems in a Cold War setting where global order hinged on the outcomes of totalized ideological conflict, today the rise to dominance of spiritual conflict transforms the Christian realignment into a Western Hemisphere hardpoint that strategically strengthens America where it often seems weakest. The Donroe Doctrine is perfectly poised to avail itself of this shift. With the agentic revolution transforming people’s sense of human purpose and meaning, the administration’s frontier tech-first approach to national security and power projection must be grounded in a spiritual capacity robust enough to preserve citizens’ lived experience of human identity and authority as the sacred basis of their future thriving.
The urgency of incorporating Latin America’s spiritual capacity into the strategic logic of the tech-forward Trump Corollary is heightened still further by the fact that China’s fiercest, cheapest, and most sustained threats against America are precisely Beijing’s round-the-clock soft-power attacks on the cognitive and psychological security of the American people. It is time to admit this asymmetric spiritual war against the US and its allies requires spiritual resources to defend against and, ultimately, roll back—without running afoul of the Constitution’s and the people’s prohibition of formally theocratic government. China’s suite of spiritually destructive tools is a logical and premeditated expression of the regime’s warfighting doctrine. America’s opportunity for a potent soft-power response rooted in hemispheric spiritual capacity is as clear as it is cohesive with the overarching aim of the Trump Corollary to prioritize the state-of-the-art, up-to-date enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine as a keystone of America First policy. Policymakers must therefore pay special attention to the careful design of harmonious functionalities between Christianity’s value to cognitive security and psychological operations defense on the one hand and Donroe-led, tech-driven US grand strategy on the other. After sketching out this approach, indicating how too much or too little ambition will lead policy astray, the essay will conclude with an emphasis on how the recommended approach will accrue concrete short-term benefits from which more sweeping and enduring gains can be catalyzed.
Soft Power After Neoliberalism
The Trump administration’s characteristically aggressive pursuit of the freshly-formulated “Donroe Doctrine”, also known as the President’s “Corollary” to Monroe, has prompted established public and private sector elites to admit what has arguably been obvious for some time: the “rules-based international order”, as figures from Canadian PM Mark Carney to legendary investor Ray Dalio now observe, is over. While critics of the administration continue to maintain that Trump himself is to blame for the rupture, the waning Biden years, especially in hindsight, plainly indicate that neoliberal elites saw little choice but to respond to the rise of Trump—and, crucially, the broader global realignment aroused by technological acceleration of which Trump’s return to power was a part—by recourse to an increasing menu of exceptions to their ostensible rules of law and custom.
Disagreement on this score is now almost universally restricted to whether it constitutes a “good” or “bad thing”. Somewhat obscured by the debate are the mechanics of the once-innovative construct of neoliberal grand strategy that appear most likely to usefully port over to the administration’s sobering task of restoring and restructuring hemispheric order very much on the fly. A striking lesson of the neoliberal project is that, under certain circumstances of national division or paralysis, the most promising way to rearchitect domestic order in a fast-changing world is to begin by projecting new structures and frameworks abroad, shaping a regional environment which then, in turn, can reshape institutional internals under more favorable conditions. The epitome of this neoliberal process was the networked creation of governance by initially “non”-governmental organizations—entities which, over time, achieved sufficient international power and authority to enable their orchestrators and administrators to apply the new form of governance to the United States itself, ultimately mobilizing it with remarkable (but in the end unsuccessful) impact against the very rise of the MAGA movement itself.
While much of the analysis around these dynamics has understandably focused on the large-scale conflict between entrenched political or ideological factions, from the standpoint of a forward-looking assessment of US prospects in grand strategy, the main focus begins with a revisitation of soft power—the fundamental concept that animated the neoliberal imperative to keep strategic pace with the transformative changes of the late 20th century world political economy. It is soft power which the founding neoliberals theorized to account for the present and future strategic alternations which global and national deindustrialization demanded; for Joseph Nye, influenced by his career-long academic partner Robert Keohane, soft power was the suite of tools the importance and efficacy of which suddenly ballooned at a time when hard power—industrial military might—had begun to wane, both on the input side (factory production) and the output side (strategic victories). As both Cold War superpowers entered a sustained period of deceleration and, indeed, battlefield defeat, the rise epitomized by postwar Japan and Germany of postindustrial knowledge work betokened a radically new strategic logic and environment, one akin to the transfiguration of productivity itself from fundamentally a question of scaling hardware to one of scaling, profoundly more quickly, software.
At the same time, the dramatic return to global significance of the postwar Anglosphere on the back of what eventually became reified as “the creative class”—the elite-led pipeline of cultural impresarios dominating arts, entertainment, communications, and what Jacques Ellul famously called (in his book Propaganda) “the formation of men’s attitudes.” In light of these sweeping trends, and their colossal implication for the structure and practice of offensive and defensive security, there is nothing logically surprising or intellectually suspect about the neoliberal turn to retheorizing power so as to restructure the world political economy on a newly “soft” basis, one which could, at a certain maturation point, then recursively transform the domestic power system, which at the time was firmly in the grip of the hard-power establishment operant from Nixon through Ford and Reagan. This mechanism remains analytically and strategically robust today—perhaps, paradoxically, it has gained in explanatory and entrepreneurial power.
What is more, in fact, the technological acceleration definitive of this particular moment is retrieving—as Marshall McLuhan brilliantly adduced—a form of soft power with a formative structure that the neoliberal innovators of soft-power governance thoroughly, conspicuously, and perhaps fatally elided from both their theoretical apparatus and their operational practice. While soft power, as coined by Nye, initially referred simply to “the ability to affect others by attraction and persuasion rather than just coercion and payment”, even Nye himself kept the door open to slippage in this definition: “soft power was only one component of power, and rarely sufficient by itself.” While Nye may perhaps have been naive in thinking that coercive and noncoercive forms of power could work in concert without blurring together so much as to alter the very meaning of soft power, that is what began to happen when, in later decades, neoliberals at last commanded the full apparatus of state power—a state that had become the unipolar “hyperpower”—and reinterpreted soft power accordingly. “The ability to combine hard and soft power into successful strategies where they reinforce each other could be considered “smart power” (a term later used by Hillary Clinton as Secretary of State).” As Nye recounts, eventually both US and Chinese leaders decided that ever larger investments in soft power were essential to their security and power projection; and, especially as “cyber” entered the equation, smart power swiftly ate soft power as an independent category: who dared deploy power in a way that was soft but not smart? Increasingly, the hard use of soft power—weaponizing what seemed to be merely invitational or optional experiences, institutions, and environments—came to define smart power. What could be a harder, more powerful strategy than convincing your opponent that your costly and coercive acts against him are just soft-power games he can opt out of at any time?
One would be excused for finding this at first glance a remarkable turn of events for a concept that emerged initially from a sort of moralistic syncretism that sought above all to avoid the baggage and horrors of the industrial and pre-industrial ages: ancient hatreds, wars of religion, and calculated mass destruction. The smart power concept belongs in its origins not to Nye, who swiftly popularized it, but to his fellow Harvard/Harvard degree-holder Suzanne Nossel; where Nye’s soft-power theorizing reflected his Unitarian-Universalist disposition to eschew formal Church doctrines in favor of ethical principles any thoughtful person of good will might be likely to respect, Nossel’s smart-power framework reflected a more juridically-inclined but still ethically grounded secular Jewish attitude, strongly informed by her post-Holocaust experience. From the beginning, in other words, smart power existed as a framework by which power could be wielded in a way Christians (and Jews) would find it hard to object to—despite the framework locating its ethical basis in a manner superficially “Judeo-Christian” but actually, in the religious sense, post-Jewish and post-Christian. Smart power provided cover for increasingly coercive and invasive applications of soft power by appealing to a secularized values framework built to trump explicitly Christian objections on the basis of its inclusivity and ecumenicism.
The significance of this intellectual genealogy is that, today, “organized religion”—whatever its declines in certain areas—has outlived and exceeded in social vitality the neoliberal project of reorganizing Western grand strategy on a moralistic ethical basis of syncretic but secularized “core values”. Even the most honored and centered of mere “values” have proven unable to secure public cognitive security and provide for the common defense against psychological operations at scale. Especially given the urgency of the administration’s need to rebuild and redeploy US grand strategy on an America First basis, it is highly advisable for such a significant development as this to be treated simply as one of the many structural changes in social organization that plays out over historical time and must be accepted and incorporated into strategic planning and execution. What is more, it ought to be recognized as the consequence of America’s unique and unprecedented technological acceleration—which, as I detailed in Human Forever, has thrown into freshly stark relief the ultimate questions about what defines our human identity and what trustable authority can answer such questions in terms commensurate with the radically changed status of human beings brought about by highly automated and networked superintelligence. These, in short, have always been theological questions, and their return under that guise—exposing what is to many the shocking weakness of secular neoliberal values to provide sticky and broadly persuasive answers—makes plain that any strategists today must take as their point of departure the increasingly central influence of technological and theological experience on the foundational matter of geopolitics.
Spiritual Capacity as Hemispheric Security
The judgment here is not that neoliberal values are obsolete or extinct, but that, as Alexis de Tocqueville showed, the political laws formalizing equality in freedom depend on deeply shared mores—which in turn arise, not from hard and soft power smartly applied, but from a deep reservoir of spiritual capacity, voluntarily formalized among the people into religious institutions. In the present context, this Tocuquevillean rule of American governance affirms that the smartest Donroe-Doctrine harmonization of soft and hard power will draw forth the benefits of well-institutionalized religious life in Latin America—specifically in their capacity to encourage a healthy, fruitful, and well-ordered embrace and use of the new American operating system.
Indeed, Latin America is the very best, perhaps only, place for the US to put such a new model to the test. The rise of the multipolar moment is, as Tocqueville would surely recognize, not simply a matter of power politics; today, the world’s leading digital powers are civilization-states rushing to reestablish their governing authority on a basis at least consistent with their deepest religious roots, if not much more. Russia’s Orthodox Church has resumed its age-old position in Byzantine-style symphonia with the governing regime. The “Chinese characteristics” which Beijing’s elite understands to have reworked Marxism into a digital age-dominant operating system arise from the monist spirituality of Daoism and Buddhism, in contrast to what China sees as the fatally fractured mind-body dualism hardwired into the West from its Hellenic origins. Louder and prouder Hindu nationalism, at home and abroad, has accompanied India’s bid for a place at the table of the leading digital powers. Europeans reeling from the failure of neoliberal governance controls take growing notice of the Vatican’s increasingly assertive and ambitious plans to ground Continental order in the hierarchical spiritual authority of Rome. And under Netanyahu, Israel’s rise to a global digital power has come on the back of rhetoric ever more confidently channeling the ancient faith. In sum, our multipolar moment is fundamentally one of spiritual multipolarity, a clarifying fact for prioritizing geostrategic goals and methods.
Whatever the wisdom of increasingly engaging with Europe and Russia on the basis of Christian preparedness to avoid psychic collapse in the weaponized digital environment, such a move must rank as a secondary priority at best according to the necessities structured by an America First relaunch of a tech-forward Monroe Doctrine. In distinct contrast to much of Europe’s near-complete secularization, and to the patchwork, moderate, and pluralist observance in the US, Latin America’s religious strength makes it the West’s strategic reserve of Christianity. With weekly church attendance around two thirds, totaling some 350 million practicing, the region delivers the US a crucial and undervalued resource advantage—the spiritual equivalent of its natural resource deposits—at a time when technological advancement has both inspired and orchestrated a shift away from the ideological conflict matrix of principles and propaganda toward a spiritual conflict matrix of authority and identity.
And, in contrast to Europe and Russia’s greater willingness to accept more adversarial relations with the US until further notice, Latin America offers a more socioeconomically, culturally, and spiritually sympathetic realm, which must be carefully and proactively nourished and built upon to counter and weaken entrenched, China-supported regional opposition to both neoliberalism and tech-forward MAGA. Following historical habits, some may hesitate to consider faith as a preeminent vector for closer geopolitical relations due to predominantly Catholic Latin America’s connections to the Vatican; the changing of the guard in Rome from a socialist Argentine Pope to the first American Pope should dispel such concerns. The fruitful strategy is neither to use American power to control the Church nor to use the Church to control regional governments. Tocqueville, in keeping with his account of the religious roots of institutionalized equality in freedom, emphasized that the theocratic turn in France discredited both Church and State to such a degree that the discontent fueled a left-revolutionary movement that nearly destroyed them both—and spurred successors, still active in the world today, that prove Tocqueville’s point transcends historical circumstances. At the same time, overcorrective policy aimed at observing a cordon sanitaire between religious and political institutions, or restricting activity to tactical shows of affinity or support, is also an error. The neoliberal approach of institutionalizing regime change by converting soft power into NGO hardpoints certainly recognized the inadequacy of official platitudes, but eventually discredited itself when the NGO complex revealed itself to be in fact a new form of governance apparatus. Now, strategists should recognize that healthy churches are true non-governmental organizations, which interface with policy goals in an appropriate way by forming people with strong cogsec and spiritual defense at scale, securing their capacity and competence to use frontier technology without becoming mass casualties of the higher-dimensional psyops at the forefront of the new digital politics of spiritual war.
It must be emphasized that other leading digital powers are adopting this general approach to national security and sphere of influence as best befits the spiritual culture of their respective civilization-states. Russia’s increasingly Orthodox regime affiliation clearly reflects Moscow’s explicit framing of Western smart power as out-and-out Satanism. Beijing’s policies of Sinicizing all religious doctrine, prioritizing the suppression of Christian churches, rehabilitating Confucianism, and actively exporting Daoism—its only indigenous religion—demonstrate that even Communist ideology is not enough to prevent the strategically reshaping of public security toward a more spiritual foundation. In Europe, both the UK and the EU are now taking extraordinary legal steps to establish spiritually doctrinal “wokeness” that flagrantly violate longstanding Western norms and principles of ostensibly universal human rights. With Latin America, the US has a singular opportunity to present a more attractive turn toward protecting and rewarding beneficiaries in its core area of strategic concern.
Rather than literally demonizing adversaries or enshrining a repressive doctrinal system, the US can lead on Hemispheric integrity and prosperity by consistently working with Latin American allies and friends to secure and advance its techno-industrial strength on terms of mutual benefit to American state capacity and Latin American spiritual capacity. There is enormous room for technological advancements that do not attack Christian or Church life, and indeed for Christians and churches to demonstrate and guide the free and healthy use of frontier technologies. Lived Christianity is a uniquely potent antidote for the unintended consequences of poor preparation for the use of frontier technology, as it is for the quite deliberate exploitation of the technological environment by adversaries to damage and degrade the health, wellness, and unity of the target population. From a medical or clinical standpoint, practicing Christians show dramatically lower rates of addiction, dysphoria, suicide, psychosis, family breakdown, and dissociative behavior. While no religious affiliation offers automatic “immunity” from ill feeling or misfortune, the more vague but none the less destructive contemporary maladies of anxiety, executive dysfunction, identity crisis, exhaustion, and hopelessness all tend to more severely afflict “post-Christian” Americans than their churched or otherwise observant compatriots.
The case of El Salvador epitomizes the key competition in today’s multipolar moment: a race to secure national unity through the harmonization of the regime’s frontier tech with its people’s ancient faith. The country’s digital-driven criminal prosecution and law enforcement was embraced through the Bukele government’s framing of basic safety as a practical precondition for the spiritual function and flourishing of traditional families and congregations. Likewise, the regime’s adoption of Bitcoin as legal tender was promoted as an uplift effort nested within a broader policy of holy warfare against public misery. While Bukele’s tactics on justice and Bitcoin continue to attract debate, his overall approach to justifying technological measures through his people’s sense of spiritual authority is clear. It’s foremost a matter of recognizing authority, not imposing law—a classic case of soft power’s importance beyond what hard power can achieve. In a regime where theocracy is off the table, spiritual authority to guide technological agency cannot properly be recognized by establishing a church or a religion, especially in sovereign countries abroad. In fact, Pope Leo XIV’s recent expositions of Christian approaches to frontier technology reflect a strong awareness of theocracy’s strategic inadequacy, due to its superposition of legal codes over “the wisdom of the heart”, even in non-democratic or mixed regimes. Leo’s interventions to date reflect the viability of a spiritual sensibility that harmonizes the experiences of the New World and the Old, especially in their US expression and the first case and their Latin American expression in the second. The fruitful path, then, is to enlist Latin American allies in the strategic expansion of the US tech stack by stressing and ensuring that the spiritual capacity of the region is ideal for the optimal deployment and utilization of the stack, both to rebuff almost unimaginably sophisticated AI-first spiritual attacks at scale and to avoid the sort of dystopian “man-made horrors beyond comprehension” prophetically warned against by Nikola Tesla.
In short, Latin America’s exceptional Christian vitality is a critical strategic asset for the US amid great power competition with China, deep instability in Europe, and volatile trends from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Sunda Islands. The Trump Corollary offers an indispensable opportunity to protect and leverage this asset by prioritizing the internal development of the Western Hemisphere on highly favorable terms and denying strategic footholds, such as those already present at scale in the US itself, to outside powers like China. To stress the point, the leverage created by strategic success in Latin America can apply in large measure to halting and reversing the severe penetration and degradation of American society by China’s long policy of highly effective asymmetric, nontraditional warfare—to which we now turn.
Strongest Adversary, Greatest Threat
It is now the conventional wisdom that China is America’s mightiest opponent, however useful it may be for both Washington and Beijing to strike more conciliatory or cooperative tones in public. Recent de-escalation efforts, ranging from Chinese intervention via Pakistan to defuse the Iran war to the Trump administration’s (unsuccessful) diplomatic effort to strike a grand geopolitical and economic bargain on Xi Jinping’s turf, have proven insufficient to alter either China’s adversarial actions within the US itself or the problem set which America must therefore address. Grappling for a focused approach to the problem, some analysts and policymakers insist that the Communist Party of China, and not the civilization-state itself, is the true enemy. Doubtless, China’s unique menace has to do with the sweep, severity, and invidiousness of the Party’s extraordinary expertise in its well-elabored doctrines of unrestricted multi-dimensional warfare. Its “three warfares” or “allfare” doctrine marshalls a complex, full-spectrum set of non-kinetic actions designed to afflict and weaken the US via cognitive attrition and degradation; theft of IP, personal information, and large datasets combines with targeted and large-scale influence operations to psychologically degrade and socially divide the American people. To be clear, while China strongly disfavors Christianity at home, its goal in the US is not to directly discourage or replace Christian belief. More insidiously, it works to dissolve the invisible foundations of human identity and agency. As these dispiriting forms of weaponized soft power strike at deeper tissue than mere public opinion or economic life, attacks traditionally interpreted as targeting “infosec” or “cogsec” are better understood as acts of increasingly spiritual war.
Yet, as social, cultural, and military technologization has led China’s doctrines ever deeper into the spiritual realm (a change mirrored profoundly within America’s own intelligence doctrine and practice since at least the 1960s), it has become increasingly clear that the digital politics of spiritual war are neither owned nor monopolized by communism as an ideology or the Communist Party as an institution. Today, asymmetric full-spectrum spiritual war waged against an adversary’s people is a tool in any major digital power’s toolkit, much as atomic weapons, soon after their first use, became the baseline, not the pinnacle, for membership in the top tier of world powers. The new kind of war China is already waging against the US is not America’s greatest threat because it is in some ontological sense communist, or because it is being waged against us by our mightiest opponent. Israel has become conspicuous in recent years for punching far above its conventional weight in tech-forward warfighting, which now inherently includes in the suite of core capabilities the kind of approach China has so successfully scaled. Developments in and around Ukraine further underscore that the US government should not lull itself into a false sense of security that the threat of asymmetric spiritual war as China wages it today can be neutralized or marginalized simply through a focus on countering Beijing or “taking down the CCP”. The new spiritualized way of digital warfare is a baseline persistent threat with the strongest power to flout America’s greatest strengths and penetrate into its worst vulnerabilities. Any true America First policy must not allow the American people themselves to become the weakest link in the security chain or the easiest target on the attack surface.
Notably, however, China’s approach to Latin America differs profoundly from its techno-spiritual assault on domestic America. The deep roots and long pedigree of revolutionary party ideology south of the border provide Beijing with an opportunity set that rewards techno-economic penetration and exploitation with a friendly face, with narrative propaganda as only a light supplement, and regional religious belief is left largely untouched. So far, American gains in the region, from Venezuela to Argentina, have not been dramatic enough to push China to reformat this southerly strategy. The result is a dynamic that, from the US standpoint, cuts both ways: Chinese influence is a tougher nut to crack, but Latin American Christianity is a greater resource with which to do so. Pro-China elites in the US are more hostile to Christianity than China-friendly Latin American elites, whose relationship with Beijing is closer than their US counterparts’, but more transactional. The underlying motives contrast: north of the border, a desire to be more like China; south, a desire to have more Chinese money and infrastructure.
But the momentous choice between adopting the US versus the Chinese tech stack raises the stakes for Latin America, because the two tech stacks institutionalize different ways of life. To accept one or the other stack is not just to acquire more of one or the other patron state’s goods and services, but to become more like one or the other. The American tech stack is the better choice for Christian Latinos. And Latin America’s strong Christianity makes embracing the American tech stack more attractive and less risky. Some could be tempted to call it a match made in heaven.
From this standpoint, Donroe affords a priceless first-time opportunity to rapidly deploy at the theater level a comprehensive strategic response to the most severe challenge to American national security and national interests. Latin America provides a uniquely robust test of flourishing Christian life at scale as a forward defense (and eventual rollback) against the new great game of asymmetric, tech-forward spiritual war. Much as the Reagan administration strategically focused on defeating the Soviet Union even though its vision of the novy sovetsky chelovek, a techno-industrially mass-produced superman, turned out to port easily from communism into a more capitalistic expression, the Trump administration should focus on defeating the Chinese expression of techno-spiritual war in order to establish the geostrategic conditions necessary to identifying, facing, and defeating other and future attacks of the same existentially threatening type.
Christianity’s unique function today as pre-scaled cogsec and psychosocial defense infrastructure ought to play a decisive role in shaping and executing US grand strategy—a role which logically and pragmatically begins right where the administration’s America First approach finds its most crucial expression abroad. The Trump Corollary prioritizes hemispheric security through techno-strategic leadership and acceleration, free from costly tradeoffs such as further eroding cognitive and spiritual security (and allied and popular sympathy and support in the process). This non-negotiable goal demands stable and durable human capital, not simply as organic cogs in a cyborg “technate” but as thriving, unique beings healthy in heart and soul. Latin America’s Christian communities represent the hemisphere’s largest existing reservoir of such organic and institutional resilience—a vital and irreplaceable resource of “rare heavenly materials”, akin to the material importance of rare earth materials, which America should gladly incorporate into a free and fair trade arrangement for the export and deployment of the US tech stack.
Conclusion
The Donroe Doctrine’s “enlist and expand” updated approach to strengthening relations with Latin America will enhance distributed hemispheric defense-in-depth against asymmetric techno-spiritual attacks on peoples—increasing social health and stability, reducing migration, rolling back transnational criminal organizations, and improving sovereign investment and market prospects for US high tech and supply chain firms. The resultant hemispheric techno-economic dominance will grow civic and defense pies from Alaska to Argentina while discouraging dystopian futures and strengthening public resilience, forming a virtuous cycle that enables and rewards the administration’s intended disentanglement from Europe’s fractious slide into disenchanted absolutism.
Respecting and operationalizing Latin America’s spiritual capacity provides a post-neoliberal soft-power counter or preempt to regionally stubborn charges of Yankee neo-imperialism, interference in national governments, one-way economic exploitation and creeping over-militarization. Successful values-aligned partnerships already in place, including the Bukele, Milei, and other governments, perhaps including Venezuela’s, provide a stable starting point to expand out from. All told, Latin America’s healthy Christian peoples give post-Donroe America indispensable strategic depth and psycho-moral reserve, forming a hemispheric firewall that the current administration and its successor can use wisely to further America First policies while enriching and protecting lives from pole to pole.
