For centuries, artillery was the best, and only, weapon system capable of landing a huge strike against the enemy at long range on the battlefield. Smart commanders learned to use these giant machines to shape the battlefield for maneuver forces and artillery claimed the title “The King of Battle” for good reason. Simply put, the commander with the most big guns for fire support almost always won. Embracing fires and knowing how to maximize their use in the field granted any commander an enormous advantage over their opponents. However, technological advancements in both weapons and the invention of aircraft offered commanders new options to attack the enemy on the battlefield. Pilots could locate and target enemies well beyond the ranges of the biggest artillery pieces on both land and sea. World War II demonstrated that artillery was no longer the only form of fires on the battlefield, and that reconnaissance was not limited to a soldier on a hilltop squinting through binoculars.
The tactics and doctrine developed using aircraft during World War II reached their zenith in the first Gulf War in 1991. The famed air campaign that launched the war made short work of the Iraqi defenses. The effective use of aircraft all but ended the war before it could even begin. The awesome display of dominance in the air over Iraq masked the underlying truth behind the success of that air offensive. The commander with the most fire support still won, but this time that was in the form of missiles delivered by aircraft rather than artillery pieces.
The successes of the Gulf War led to decades of weapons systems and tactics built around aircraft. But, this has missed an important point: NATO superiority in missile and weapon technology was what enabled that lightning offensive, aircraft were just the primary delivery mechanism. The conflict in Ukraine has demonstrated that missile technology has advanced considerably since the 1990s, and air superiority isn’t a prerequisite to dominate the battlefield. This has enormous implications for the weapons systems that will be the cornerstone of American arms in a future peer conflict.
We can no longer be guided by the experiences of a war from more than three decades ago. To be ready for the next war, the US must understand what air power is at its core and recognize that missiles and guided munitions are the key to success.
Understanding What Air Power Means
Air power was the best, and often, the only way to deliver the high-tech missiles and guided bombs of the Gulf War in 1991. The advanced weapons of that time could only be deployed from an equally advanced platform. We take smart phones and laptops for granted today, but it’s difficult to overstate just how far computing technology and miniaturization have come since 1991. The technical limitations of computers at the tail end of the Cold War meant that the hardware and software necessary to program advanced guided weapon systems could only fit onto a ship or airframe. While the Army was trying to develop the technology required to calculate advanced firing solutions and wirelessly transmit that data to firing units in the 80’s, the computer science to meet those requirements didn’t exist. It wasn’t until 2003 and the Second Iraq War that the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFTADS) was fully fielded. The AFATDS unlocked all the advanced digital fire control capabilities for guided munitions for the common soldier in the form of a laptop. This decade long gap however, led to a fundamental misunderstanding of what “Air” really brings to the fight. Commanders had come to rely on air power for guided munitions and expensive weapons programs were developed on the assumption that air power is required to win the fight on the ground. While this assumption may have been true twenty years ago, it is no longer valid.
Since the end of the Cold War, technology has quietly democratized high-tech guided weapons that previously could only be employed from the skies. The conflict in Ukraine proves that aircraft no longer have a monopoly as the best system for reconnaissance and delivery of missiles, rockets, and bombs.
Advances in drone and missile technology have changed the ways aircraft can and should be used in conflict. Drones and mobile, ground-based artillery platforms can observe and launch guided missiles in support of ground troops faster, at less risk, and for less cost than attack aircraft. As has been seen in Ukraine, an infantry platoon armed with Javelins can bring the same Anti-Tank Guided Missile capabilities to the field that used to be reserved for the A-10 and Apache aircraft. Similarly, man-portable Air Defense and larger ground-based systems can also more effectively engage attack aircraft without needing expensive air superiority fighters to loiter near enemy air defenses.
Air power only truly maintains its competitive advantage over other systems in high level air interdiction. Aircraft operating in this domain enjoy all the benefits of modern avionics and missile technology without exposing themselves to modern ground air defense networks. In the future, air power can best utilize its weapons defensively to create a bubble for the ground commander to operate unhindered by the enemy and outsource reconnaissance and ground attack to other platforms less vulnerable to interdiction.
Drones As the Eyes In The Sky
For years the eyeball was the only reliable way to validate and provide reconnaissance data in real time, whether on the ground with binoculars or from a cockpit with binoculars. The targeting pod and observation capabilities that came with it in the 1970s and 80s were truly a revolution for how armies scout and target the enemy on the battlefield. Forty years ago, this technology could only be employed on an airplane, satellite, or helicopter. Satellites are at low risk of enemy interference but are not responsive and easily affected by environmental factors. Helicopters and planes can loiter over the battlefield and react quickly to conditions on the ground but are extremely vulnerable to enemy attacks.
Placing that same observation technology on a drone offers a scouting solution that has the loiter time and low risk of a satellite with the responsiveness of an aircraft. This has completely revolutionized forward observation and reconnaissance. These tiny mobile platforms provide accurate targeting data in real time to the gun line or the missile battery. The range of these drones also means this capability does not have to be limited to the most important missions, nor only to the front line. Drones can find the machine gun nest just beyond the ridgeline just as easily as they can find the S400, BM-27, or a division command post operating well behind the established frontline. Spreading these drones around the battlefield enables a platoon commander to quickly spot and engage an enemy hard point with his own organic mortars or direct support artillery while a separate drone observes a high value target to be engaged by division artillery fires. This can all be done on the ground without the need to risk an Apache or an F-16 to spot for them. Outsourcing aerial reconnaissance to drones will give the ground commander more autonomy and free the air commander to use those resources elsewhere.
Employing Guided Munitions from the Ground Up
Advances in computer technology and miniaturization have revolutionized guided munitions in the same way drones changed the reconnaissance game. Tactical ballistic missiles like the ATACMS (Army Tactical Missile System) and the new Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) can strike at operational or even strategic level targets without risking an expensive bomber. Both missile systems can move around the battlefield quickly in the highly mobile HIMARS to avoid counter-battery fire. The AFATDS has also improved significantly in its capabilities and allows soldiers to direct fires from the back of a Humvee with a radio.
Front line troops can now precisely engage enemy targets in the close fight with Precision guidance kits (PGK) for cannon artillery and guided MLRS rockets (GMLRS). Drones can also fit Hellfire missiles and JDAMs on their wings and loiter over the battlefield far longer than a jet or helicopter. Anti-Tank Guided Missiles have also been brought down to average infantryman and his fighting vehicle. The TOW missile was and still is an excellent weapon system, but its wire guided technology and large size meant it was cumbersome and required a visual lock to be used successfully. The new Javelin and NLAWS don’t require wire guidance or a tripod to set up and give front line troops the same capabilities against tanks and infantry fighting vehicles as an attack aircraft with Hellfire missiles or Mavericks.
Massed missile and drone strikes are also the most efficient way to penetrate an air defense network. Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) missions are incredibly dangerous for pilots using the High-speed Anti Radiation Missile (HARM). Launching a HARM from a drone platform or saturating a Close-in-Weapon System (CIWS) with dozens of drones or rockets simultaneously is a significantly better option than risking a pilot and aircraft.
These improved weapon technologies have diversified the number of ways guided munitions can be employed and give the ground commander access to capabilities that would otherwise be unavailable without air support. Commanders at all levels need to rely on their missile units, artillery or otherwise, to hit high value targets without waiting for aircraft to be available. Outsourcing these capabilities to other platforms means commander on the ground can retain the without planning around the limitations of the Air Tasking Order or enemy air defense. Ukraine has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to use all the above munitions to great effect without ever needing a shred of air superiority. Russia has also been able to make repeated strikes into Ukraine despite shepherding its bomber forces. Guided missiles have made up the difference for both sides where air power has been unsuccessful.
SHORAD For Ground Commanders, By Ground Commanders
Advances in missile technology work both ways, and air defense weapons have made exponential improvements since the 90’s. This has helped specialize the role aircraft play by limiting their effectiveness in short range air defense (SHORAD) and close air support, while cementing their dominance in air interdiction. In short, it is not just that terrestrial systems like drones and guided munitions now can replace many of the same functions of expensive aircraft. Using aircraft for SHORAD purposes is more dangerous than ever.
Man Portable Air Defense (MANPADs) are and have always been a cheap but effective SHORAD defense system. Naturally, they have become commonplace in Ukraine on both sides of the conflict. A company of air defenders operating in teams with MANPADs can effectively deny access to close air support over a large area. When coupled with other SHORAD systems mounted on vehicles like the Starstreak or Roland, penetrating the tactical air defense net is a risky gamble at best for any helicopter or slow flying jet aircraft. The first 72 hours of the Russian invasion saw these weapons decimate the Russian Airborne and Air Assault troops. At the tactical level, SHORAD controlled by the commander on the ground should be the first line of defense. Commanders that outsource this tactical air defense responsibility to the Air Force do so at their own peril.
Air Power at its Best
SHORAD weapons systems and their missiles can’t reach high altitude threats however, and that niche is where air power continues to flex its missiles.
The Patriot and its even bigger brother, THAAD, provide one half of the long range air defense net, primarily acting in missile defense. The Patriot earned a controversial reputation after the SCUD attacks in the Gulf War but has since proven itself in Ukraine against the best missiles Russia has in her arsenal (for whatever that’s still worth). The newer THAAD missile boasts a longer range than the Patriot and provides an even bigger defense bubble. These massive missile and radar weapon systems don’t come without a few drawbacks, however. They must be deployed in fixed in defensive positions, are slow to re-arm, and are vulnerable to massed missile attacks. The F-22 and F-15 are incredibly fast, nimble, and heavily armed missile platforms. When directed by an Aerial Early Warning Radar or either of those incredibly powerful ground radar systems, there is simply no better air defense platform in the world. The AIM-120 and AIM-9X are both excellent missiles that can track and kill a target well beyond visual range to include missiles. Specializing in this strategic role of denying air space to the enemy maximizes the advantages of our aircraft while minimizing risk. Operating in a defend/deny posture also means if an aircraft is shot down, there is a high chance the pilot will eject over friendly territory and won’t end up a POW. Aircraft have been used as jacks-of-all trades for a long time, but they are truly masters in this realm. Coupled with the Patriot and THAAD, the Air Force can provide the ground commander freedom of maneuver within a significant air defense bubble.
Winning the Future Fight
The upshot of these technological developments is that the fundamental assumptions that have guided the US military since the Gulf War are being rapidly overturned. Drones provide the same reconnaissance capabilities that aircraft used to at much cheaper cost. Guided munitions offer the same strike capability that aircraft used to at much cheaper cost. At the same time, advances in aerial denial are making it ever riskier to use aircraft for these purposes. Luckily there is a template for the Army to follow to fully embrace the next generation of weapons.
As an Army veteran, it pains me to admit the Navy were the first to truly embrace guided missile technology as the premiere weapon in future wars. The Navy saw how rapidly battleships became obsolete and embraced the missile age with a bear hug. Deck guns, torpedoes, and anti-air batteries were replaced with rocket launched guided torpedoes, guided anti-ship missiles and submarine launched ICBMs. The Navy developed the AEGIS system to track and shoot down barrages of enemy missiles and designed the specialized F-14 to eliminate and intercept enemy missiles and bombers at extreme ranges. Almost every platform in the US Navy whether a submarine, ship, or plane, was built around how it could best employ guided munitions since the 1970s. That emphasis on guided missiles as the future has enabled the Navy to operate without an Achilles Heel anywhere in the world.
To prepare for the battlefield of the future, the Army needs to follow the Navy’s suit and recognize that missiles are the key to winning the firepower fight. Continuing to rely on air power to make up the difference in firepower is an unnecessary risk. Even if air power still dominated the battlefield, the assumption that the US will have superiority in a future conflict with China is a dubious one. Two decades of COIN have spoiled ground commanders with uncontested skies and plentiful close air cover. Artillery was considered too inaccurate, and guided missiles were too expensive to be used by a line unit. JDAMs and Hellfires were easier to use and only a short flight away. That environment cultivated the idea that air support was the only way to get timely and accurate effects on target. In reality, air support simply can’t be considered a reliable constant in a future fight against a peer nation, and its availability should not be the limiting factor in future fights.
The Army has made a few small moves in the right direction already. Division artillery units have returned, rocket artillery is slowly returning to its 3x9 configuration, and gaps in SHORAD capabilities have been identified. These moves are not enough however, and the Army needs to be able to stand alone in the missile fight to be truly ready for the next war. SHORAD systems, especially the CIWS need to become common place in maneuver formations. Those systems are a critical piece of the Navy’s defense against missile and drone swarms and the Army needs a mobile version of them to do that job on the battlefield. Reorganizing the force to include more artillery and air support would give ground commanders the flexibility to solve dilemmas on the battlefield organically. The release authority for these weapon systems also needs to be pushed down to the brigade or even battalion command level so they can called upon quickly as conditions change and develop in real time. Retaining missiles at division or above adds time and layers of approval that make tactical commanders discount their usefulness. Finally, all the changes above need to be included in the training rotations at various National Training Centers.
The Army needs to embrace guided missiles and munitions and ensure it can maintain missile superiority over its enemies. It must be able to stand on its own two feet in the missile fight, both offensive and defensive, and treat air power as an exception rather than the rule in the next fight. Missiles are the big guns of the future, and if the Army wants to dominate the battlefield they will be the key to maintaining a competitive advantage over our adversaries.
