“One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.” This phrase has long encapsulated the problem of trying to intervene in another country. For the United States, this enigma has embroiled its diplomatic and strategic actions for centuries. Yet, since the end of the Cold War, the US has been so committed to upholding the liberal rules-based order that it has largely eschewed the use of non-state actors, such as rebels and militias, in executing foreign policy.
This must change. In the Cold War 2.0 era, the United States must prioritize rebels and other non-state actors as the primary tool for countering adversaries and their respective proxy forces.
The reasons for this are deeply tied into the nature of the global competition we now face. The liberal rules-based order that the US so diligently upheld through the 20th century and the opening innings of the 21st is now deteriorating under the pressure of authoritarian regimes. China and Russia expand their influence by exploiting systemic weaknesses, using economic coercion, disinformation campaigns, and hostile military actions (usually in the gray zone) to undermine democratic institutions and civil society.
Proxies constitute a major part of the playbook of our adversaries. China and Russia increasingly rely on private military companies (PMCs) in Africa, Middle East, and parts of Asia – and both utilize a myriad of other non-state actors to engage in cyber, information, and maritime warfare against neighbors and Western societies. Taliban fighters and other militant groups were financed by Russia to kill US forces. The United States cannot afford to cede this critical battleground. The use of proxies is not just a tactical choice, but a strategic necessity.
In response to this deteriorating order, Washington must throw out its rule book (i.e., Leahy amendments, etc.), get rid of all the lawyers in the room, and empower US special forces and other three letter agencies work with proxies that damage the interests of Beijing and Moscow. Effective US competition cannot be formulaic, nor can it continue more of the status quo approaches that the Biden Administration attempted, which did not deter or deny adversarial actions.
Indirect methods, such as training, equipping, and assisting rebels and other non-state actors, is a better way of hurting China and Russia (and other adversaries) than doubling down on continuing half-assed approaches to “integrated deterrence.” This is because proxies offer a cheap and crucial means to countering and outmaneuvering the growing influence of adversaries without risking direct military confrontation or nuclear escalation. They allow flexible, deniable, and cost-effective operations that can significantly impact the balance of power. The concept of ‘Letting Rebels Win’ should be incorporated into the broader goal of achieving outcomes that align with US national interests and broader ideas on reforming a liberal rules-based order that prevents further Chinese and Russian exploitation.
Traditionalist Washington foreign policy elites and ivory tower academics often oppose the idea of the United States engaging and supporting rebel forces. They argue that such actions legitimize the behavior and authority of these non-state actors, thereby undermining the liberal rules-based order. In addition, they worry that the image of America can be damaged by any negative actions these rebels take, such as human rights abuses and violating international law. However, these elites conveniently overlook the realities of geopolitical competition and the fact that Western capitals frequently collaborate with non-state actors, like Kurdish militias. Moreover, this legalistic and diplomatic norm against relying on proxies to achieve national interests has been nullified by virtue of extensive use of these methods by China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia.
Our distaste is also misplaced. Reliance on non-state actors is American as apple pie. For instance, during the American Revolution, General George Washington integrated “Oneida and Tuscarora warriors with his army at Valley Forge” in 1778 to scout and ambush British soldiers. Additionally, US success in the First Barbary War was largely due to a proxy army of 400 irregular troops—”a force of Bedouin tribes, mercenaries from southern Europe, and Tripolitan rebels“—led by a detachment of eight US Marines. With the victory at the Battle of Derna, this US-led proxy force marked the first occasion the American flag was hoisted on foreign soil. There’s no reason why the United States shouldn’t be working with rebels and non-traditional actors to defeat the emerging “Axis of Authoritarians.
Winning Cold War 2.0 means the United States must revisit and embrace its historical reliance on proxy forces to safeguard its interests, uphold global stability, and create strategic dilemmas for adversaries. The United States must act decisively, leveraging its historical experience and vast resources to build a network of proxy relationships that can effectively counter and surpass the efforts of China and Russia. Only through such bold action can America maintain its global leadership and protect its vital interests.
Aligning Rebels and other Non-State Actors against Adversaries
Rebels work. American support for the Mujahideen during the Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989) stands as a pivotal example of leveraging proxy forces to achieve strategic objectives. By providing financial aid, weapons, and training to these insurgent fighters, the United States was able to significantly undermine Soviet influence in Afghanistan without committing large-scale American troops. At a cost of only about $20 billion, this support not only contributed to the eventual withdrawal of Soviet forces but also showcased the efficacy of indirectly engaging insurgents for the purposes of countering superpower adversaries. Mujahideen resistance dealt a severe blow to Soviet morale and resources, hastening the decline of the Soviet Union and ultimately contributing to the end of the Cold War. There’s no reason why Washington can’t do this elsewhere in the world to create strategic problems for Beijing and Moscow, especially given the amount of cyber-attacks, information operations, and undersea cable cutting, being conducted against the American Homeland and in other Western societies.
Using Rebels against Russia
Russia’s military presence in the Mediterranean continues to pose a threat to the southern flank of NATO. Despite the fall of the Assad regime in Syria in December of 2024, Russia still appears to have control over its two main bases in Syria – and shows no major signs of abandoning them. Additionally, recent evidence suggests major movements of weapon systems and other cargo to Russian bases in Libya.
In response, the United States should consider bolstering its collaboration with the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) rebel leadership in Syria. Despite the controversial past of HTS, their collaborative efforts in toppling the Assad regime present a unique opportunity to counter Russian (and Iranian) influence in the region. By offering targeted military aid, intelligence support, and economic incentives, the US and interested European allies can encourage HTS to take a more active role in ensuring that the Russian Hmeimim air base and the Tartus naval facility are vacated, further weakening Russia’s military presence in the region; not to mention removing a haven for Iran. A supportive deal with HTS rebel leadership, framed within a broader strategy to restore stability in Syria, would help decisively limit Russian influence in the Middle East and Mediterranean. This approach not only aligns with a broader American strategy of weakening Russian power but also supports the establishment of a stable, post-Assad Syria, paving the way for a more balanced regional power structure.
In a similar vein, the US and EU should deepen their engagement with warlord General Khalifa Haftar and his Libyan National Army (LNA). This rebel faction controls the central and eastern areas of Libya, whereas the UN-backed and internationally recognized Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA) exists in a small area around Tripoli. Haftar’s LNA forces have demonstrated significant capability in combating extremist groups and securing strategic locations within Libya, but this has meant giving basing access to Russia in its sectors of control. Haftar appears to have a made a deal with Russia; arms in exchange for basing rights in Libya.
Even before the fall of Assad, Russia had been building a military presence and de facto bases in Libya, as a way of supporting deeper Russian expeditionary operations of its mercenary force, known as the Africa Corps, deeper into Africa. And since the fall of Assad, many of the forces and equipment in Syria have been transported to southern Libya where Russia appears to be building a new base. The spike in Russian flights from Syria to this new desert base in Libya indicates Moscow’s intent to maintain a strategic foothold in the Mediterranean and across Africa. Libya is now a battleground for superpowers, with Russia aiming to solidify its influence. By enhancing military cooperation, providing advanced weaponry, and offering economic inducements, the US and EU can entice and empower the LNA to expel Russian forces and dismantle their bases. This strategy would not only serve US interests in reducing Russian influence but also contribute to the broader goal of stabilizing Libya and accepting the reality of two Libya’s: a Tripoli area under GNA control and a rebel LNA force based in Tobruk controlling about two-thirds of Libya. A coordinated effort with Haftar could potentially shift the balance of power in Libya, ensuring a more secure and pro-Western government in the region.
Using Rebels against China
Following the US withdrawal, China has swiftly moved to capitalize on Afghanistan’s vast mineral resources, particularly lithium and copper—two critical elements for economic productivity, manufacturing, batteries, and weapon systems. Given that China began imposing export bans on critical minerals against the United States in December 2024, the West must be forward looking on how to prepare for further export mineral bans, especially given how much China “Controls minerals that run the world.”
Accepting the Taliban for strategic gain should also be on the table for the West. The United States and other Western powers must pragmatically accept that these rebels ‘won’ Afghanistan – despite two decades of fighting them. Thinking long-term about Western interests, accepting Taliban control over Afghanistan is the first step to countering China’s growing influence in the region. In fact, current US policy is “pragmatic engagement” with the Taliban – but even this is broken because the West appears bent on trying “to find a way to balance engagement while not compromising on our principles.”
By engaging with the Taliban, the US and EU can create a mutually beneficial arrangement that not only stabilizes Afghanistan but also ensures that these vital minerals are not monopolized by China. The Taliban, eager to gain international legitimacy and economic support, may be open to such cooperation. A well-structured deal can offer economic incentives, development aid, and infrastructure support in exchange for the Taliban limiting Chinese access to these resources, and giving preferential treatment to Western companies to mine and export many of the minerals that are estimated to be worth up to $3 trillion.
Working with the Taliban is not out of the norm, no matter how unpopular it may be at most American thinktanks and university campuses. In fact, India has been supporting the Pakistani Taliban since 2010. The Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) are anti-Pakistan and regularly attack Pakistan military forces. Additionally, India has been unfazed in engaging Taliban leadership in Kabul, especially as the Afghan Taliban forces have been attacking Pakistan. Similarly, India has supported the Baloch separatists – known as the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) – in southern Pakistan. Strategically it has made sense for India to use rebels to their advantage. Creating two new domestic fronts inside of Pakistan forces a dilemma, requiring Pakistani leadership to disperse forces and resources away from the Indian border to deal with the BLA in the south and the Taliban and TTP in the west.
Elsewhere in the maritime domain, Washington and Brussels should be considering the role of using non-state actors to counter the non-state actions of Chinese citizens that are obviously acting on behalf of Beijing. For instance, if China continues to ‘accidently’ drag anchors over undersea infrastructure, like one Chinese crewed ship did in Baltic waters in November 2024, then there’s no reason why Western governments cannot hire ‘rebels-at-sea’ to patrol against Chinese-crewed vessels. In fact, China already uses a maritime militia known as “Little Blue Men” to push Chinese claims across the South China Sea. For the United States and other major powers, identifying potential non-state actors in the maritime domain to collaborate against Chinese irregular actors is a path towards making clear to China that they cannot engage in these types of activities anymore.
Conclusion: Rebels on the Rise
The United States faces a critical juncture to rethink and adapt its foreign policy strategies. The erosion of the liberal rules-based order and the aggressive maneuvers of revisionist powers like China and Russia demand a bold recalibration of American approaches to global competition. The future of American primacy hangs in the balance, and all available tools – including the strategic use of proxy forces – are needed.
Rebels and other non-state actors are a flexible and cost-effective means of projecting power and shaping outcomes in contested areas and domains. From the successful support of the Mujahideen against the Soviet Union to potential engagements with groups like HTS in Syria and the LNA in Libya, proxy warfare must be available as the only real tool for maintaining American influence without risking direct confrontation. Similarly, engaging with the Taliban in Afghanistan presents a major opportunity to counter China’s growing influence and secure critical minerals vital for Western economic and military capabilities. At the same time, the US must smartly train and equip proxies, and not make all the same mistakes made with the “chaotic” US program in 2015 meant to train Syrian rebels to fight the Islamic State.
Regardless, there are still plenty of opportunities for the US to enable rebels to undermine the national interests of adversaries. Pro-democracy rebels in Myanmar (Burma) represent a great opportunity to dislodge Chinese-backing of its ally Myanmar, which is ruled by a brutal military junta. Similarly, China represses ethnic Uighurs in its Xinjiang region, meaning this presents the possibility of finding unique ways of supporting militant Uyghurs against Chinese rule. Finally, Russia faces great internal risks from its mistreatment of ethnic minorities, with “22 ethnic republics and 4 ethnic autonomous districts” totaling at least 193 unique ethnic groups, most of which have been disproportionately mobilized to fight in Ukraine. There’s no reason why some of the most disheartened groups, such as the Chechens, Tatars, and Ukrainians, can’t be helped in forming resistance and rebel movements against Russian imperial rule, creating more internal strategic dilemmas for Moscow to address.
For these reasons, judicious use of proxy forces must be almost by necessity a cornerstone of the broader strategy to maintain American leadership in this new era of great power competition. Without it, America faces serious limitations in its ability to effectively counter the influence of its rivals, create strategic dilemmas for adversaries, and adapt to the realities of a multipolar world.
BIO:
Lieutenant Colonel Jahara “FRANKY” Matisek, PhD, (@JaharaMatisek) is a military professor in the national security affairs department at the US Naval War College, research fellow with the European Resilience Initiative Center and the Payne Institute for Public Policy, and US Department of Defense Minerva co–principal investigator for improving US security assistance. He has published two books and over one hundred articles and essays in peer-reviewed journals and policy-relevant outlets on strategy, warfare, and security assistance. Lt Col Matisek is a command pilot with over 3,700 hours of flight time that was previously an associate professor in the Military and Strategic Studies Department at the US Air Force Academy and has been a Fellow with the Homeland Defense Institute, Modern War Institute, Irregular Warfare Initiative, and the Project on International Peace and Security at William & Mary. The views expressed by Lt Col Matisek are his alone and do not reflect the official position of the US Naval War College, Department of the Air Force, Department of Defense, or the US Government.
Image Attribution: Header image “Tari Sar observation post before mortar attack on Shigal Tarna garrison, Kunar, 1987” by Erwin Franzen is licensed under CC BY-NC-SA 2.0.
