Contesting the PRC's Fishing Armada

Abstract

While the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) actions in the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of its neighbors in the South China Sea get headlines around the world, the PRC’s Distant Water Fishing (DWF) fleets devastate ecosystems and local economies while operating illegally in the EEZs of South American states such as Ecuador, Peru, and Argentina without much attention. These fleets operate in the gray area between civil and military, and thus, are difficult for most states to address without risking escalation. This issue highlights the inability of weak South American states to repel unwanted activities while also making the US appear weak in its own backyard. Additionally, the US lacks a plan for how to react to the PRC use of civilian assets to coerce weaker states.

The purpose of this paper is to propose a policy addressing this issue, aiming to reassert US influence in the Western Hemisphere by supporting these states against PRC aggression in the gray area between civil and military that these fleets operate by utilizing privateers. To do so, this paper will focus on characterizing PRC DWF fleet composition and overall operations in order to identify critical nodes, provide historical perspective of PRC DWF fleet incidents in South America, discuss the importance of addressing this issue in the scope of US grand strategy, discuss the historical precedent for use of privateers, and layout a “three strikes” escalatory policy framework for a US response leveraging Letters of Marque (LOM) to solve this issue without provoking a military response from the PRC.

Introduction

In 2016, an incident occurred off the coast of Argentina between a Chinese fishing trawler and the Argentine Navy. The Chinese fishing trawler was known as Lu Yan Yuan Yu 010, and after it was caught fishing illegally in Argentine waters, it attempted to ram an Argentine Coast Guard ship that responded ¹. The trawler was then sunk by the Argentine Navy after a pursuit. Similar incidents have taken place off the coast of Argentina, Ecuador, Peru, and Chile as hundreds of Chinese fishing trawlers descend on the waters around these states annually ². While the Chinese Maritime Militia (CMM) gets attention for their belligerence in the South China Sea (SCS), the PRC’s Distant Water Fishing (DWF) fleets have done immense damage and consistently violate the sovereignty of South American states with less scrutiny.

Considering the competition between the PRC and U.S., this presents the U.S. with an opportunity to increase ties in the Americas at the cost of PRC influence. The Western Hemisphere, central to U.S. dominance, should not see weaker states bullied by strategic rivals. This paper proposes a U.S.-led response to PRC distant water fishing (DWF) fleet actions in the region by defining the problem and geopolitical landscape, analyzing the issue within grand strategy, conducting a nodal analysis of PRC DWF fleets, and outlining a framework for U.S. support to South American states using privateers as force multipliers under Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 of the Constitution ³.

Section One: Defining the Problem & Geopolitical Environment

This section will establish a baseline understanding by defining the scope of the problem, discussing the key states involved, explaining relevant norms that are in play, and providing information on flashpoints related to PRC DWF fleets around the Americas in recent years. The scale of the damage caused by PRC DWF fleets around South America is extensive. Overfishing from Chinese vessels is responsible for approximately 80% of the fish that are caught in the waters around Argentina, Ecuador, and Peru ⁴. As an example, the legal number of squid to be caught annually in Argentina is 150k tons, and between 600k and 800k tons are caught illegally each year in Argentina and the Falkland Islands ⁵. PRC fleets also create floating cities of hundreds of fishing vessels outside of the EEZs of Argentina, Ecuador, and Peru while emitting enough light to outshine major cities in South America when observed from space ⁵. On top of the damage done by overfishing, these fleets dump large amounts of waste into the water to such an extent that roughly 30% of the garbage on the shores of the Galapagos Islands is from PRC DWF fleets ⁶. Additionally, there’s significant economic damage done by the depletion of fish stocks. This has led to tens of thousands of jobs lost and put Peru’s fishing industry on life support ⁶.

Although these issues are serious, PRC infringement on South American states’ sovereignty is a key concern. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) defines territorial zones (12NM from shore), contiguous zones (an additional 12NM), and exclusive economic zones (EEZs, 200NM) for resource control and conservation. Though Peru is not an UNCLOS signatory, Peru has claimed 200NM of maritime sovereignty since 1947, a precedent that shaped UNCLOS’s 200NM EEZ standard ⁷.

Despite having “on-paper” sovereignty over their EEZs, South American states have been unable to impose their will on PRC DWF fleets. In Ecuador, PRC fleets of 200-300 ships have persistently operated in the gap between the Ecuador’s EEZ and the Galapagos Marine Reserve (GMR), which extends around the Galapagos Islands, since 2016. The size of the fleet and its continuous presence outside of the EEZ and GMR make it nearly impossible for Ecuador to stop. One noteworthy incident regarding Ecuador came in 2017 when authorities seized the Chinese trawler Fu Yuan Yu Leng 999 while it had 6,600 illegally caught sharks and whales, many of which are endangered ⁴.

A similar issue exists near Argentina where PRC fleets stage in the “Blue Hole” which sits at the edge of the Argentine EEZ and north of the Falkland Islands. Argentina has had a greater reaction to PRC DWF fleets but has not deterred or reduced the floating cities anchored in the “Blue Hole”. Since 1986, Argentina seized 80 foreign flagged vessels in its EEZ and has sunk or fired shots at Chinese trawlers such as the Lu Yan Yuan Yu 010, mentioned in the previously ⁸. Argentina has also begun conducting exercises with the United States Coast Guard (USCG) and deploying surveillance aircraft to track the movements of the DWF fleets and deter them from entering the Argentine EEZ ⁹.

Peru and Chile are in more austere positions relating to Chinese fleet activities due to a greater level of economic dependence on the PRC. In 2024 Peru’s fishing industry took $300 million loss after a 70% decline in squid catches due to PRC overfishing ¹⁰. In early 2025, Peru authorized its military to use “legitimate force” to combat illicit fishing operations in their EEZ with the assistance of satellite surveillance ¹¹. Similarly, Chile loses approximately $400 million in annual revenue due to PRC fishing fleets and has dispatched surveillance aircraft to monitor this activity along with an attack submarine to act as a deterrent ¹².

It is important to acknowledge what is driving the actions of the PRC’s DWF fleets in the Americas and to avoid viewing their behavior as some sort of PRC geopolitical side-quest that isn’t directly tied to the grand strategy of the PRC around the world. Due to the combination of import dependence, historic vulnerability to blockades, and global aspirations; in 2012 the PRC announced its intent to become a “great maritime power” and in 2013, introduced the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) ¹³. In the context of the BRI, Chinese DWF fleets are a vital component of the PRC’s overarching maritime strategy as a means of enhancing PRC food security and connections abroad with key BRI partner states. Historically speaking, Ecuador, Peru, Chile, and Argentina have been key nodes in the BRI due to PRC imports of copper, seafood, and beef from these states ¹⁴. The PRC heavily subsidizes these DWF fleets which are managed by Chinese State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) ¹⁵ like China National Fisheries Corporation (CNFC) which oversees Zhongyu Global Seafood Corporation, and Zhoushan Ningtai Ocean Fisheries. This is all to enable the PRC DWF fleets to bring seafood back to the PRC to feed the population and for use as feed in massive multi-story Chinese pig farms.

Despite the numerous incidents and reactions from these states, the PRC fleets remain and can be monitored using a combination of satellite imagery, Automatic Identification System (AIS) tracking, and other Vessel Monitoring Systems (VMS). The environmental and economic costs paired with the sovereignty violations of these fleets present the U.S. with the opportunity to help South American states while also providing the U.S. with the opportunity to rein in PRC influence in the region and cultivate leverage over PRC supply chains.

Section Two: American Grand Strategy and the Western Hemisphere

For decades, American grand strategy has been hyper focused on the Middle East, Europe, and Asia, at the cost of neglecting foundational objectives in the Western Hemisphere. Chief among these objectives in the context of competition with the PRC is countering PRC influence while maintaining order and promoting economic stability and prosperity in the region. Over the last two decades the PRC has cultivated its influence in the Americas to the extent that it now holds significant leverage over vital infrastructure in Panama, ownership of key ports in Peru and Chile, and even built 16 space observatories in South America that serve both military and civilian purposes ¹⁶. This has happened while the PRC has also bolstered its military ties with anti-American states like Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. If the U.S. is serious about deterring or defeating the PRC at any point in the Western Pacific, it must effectively counter PRC actions in the Western Hemisphere which can undermine its ability to do just that. Everything from power projection to protection of key maritime chokepoints is undermined if the U.S. cannot assert dominance over other powers in its own backyard.

There is clear and longstanding precedent for American action in the Americas dating back to Monroe Doctrine which aimed to prevent European powers from interfering in the Americas in 1823 ¹⁷ and the Roosevelt Corollary which justified U.S. intervention in the name of stability and American security ¹⁸. Considering the widespread growth in PRC influence in the Americas through BRI projects paired with the use of PRC DWF fleets as tools for increasing PRC influence and challenging U.S. dominance, an American response is warranted. The fishing fleets represent an affront to American order in the Western Hemisphere, an enormous economic threat to weaker states that is levied by the United States’s greatest rival, and the complete disregard for maritime sovereignty norms which further American interests around the world.

The issue of PRC DWF fleets in the Americas is a complex challenge that aligns with U.S. strategy in many ways. Solving this challenge would be a high payoff target furthering U.S. dominance in the Americas and competition with the PRC.

Section Three: Characterizing PRC DWF Fleet Aims & Operations

The term DWF fleet refers to fishing fleets that operate outside of their own state’s EEZs, travelling long distances and spending a year or more at sea. DWF fleets are used to catch fish in greater numbers or of greater value than what could be caught in a state’s own EEZ. Regarding the PRC, their fleet consisted of roughly 2700 ships as of 2019 ¹⁹ and was capped at 3k ships in 2020 by the CCP, however some estimates place the size of the fleet at 17k ²⁰. The PRC represents roughly 40% of all global DWF fleet activity ²¹. The primary operating areas have been across the South Pacific, Galapagos Islands, Peru, Argentina, the Horn of Africa, West Africa, and around Japan. In terms of cultivating influence, Papua New Guinea, North Korea, Somalia, Ghana, Vanuatu, and Mauritania issued licenses to PRC fishing companies, allow Chinese ownership of local fishing entities, or have signed memorandums of understanding (MOUs) allowing access to their EEZ in return for investment. This hasn’t been the case in the Americas, wherein PRC fleets stage at the edge of EEZs prior to turning off AIS transponders and illegally operating inside EEZs.

What is the composition of PRC DWF fleets? This is important, because sustaining an international fishing fleet that can operate far from PRC EEZs for over a year is a complex operation, and if someone were looking to disrupt it, knowing which ships were more critical than others is vital. For PRC DWF fleets to function, there are three primary categories of ships that they require. First, they must have long endurance fishing vessels such as trawlers and squid jiggers that conduct the actual fishing. Second are refrigerated cargo vessels that are also known as “reefers”. Reefers are essential to the operation of DWF fleets, because they collect and store the catch from the trawlers while at sea, provide food and other supplies to fishermen, and return to home ports to unload the catch. The refrigerated cargo ships are the primary link between the fleet and their home state while the fleet is outside of their home EEZ. Third are miscellaneous support ships that provide the fleet with supplies, such as fuel or medical assistance.

Between these three types of ships, reefers are the most critical node due to how few of the PRC has dedicated to DWF fleets, and due to enabling fleet longevity by shipping the catch back to the PRC. Without the reefers, the trawlers must unload their catch in local ports or return to the PRC more often. A precise number of reefers the PRC uses for DWF support isn’t known, but a safe assumption is that 1%-5% of DWF fleets are support ships such as reefers which places the total between 30-150. Observations of the Hai Feng 718 and Fu Yuan Yu Yun 992, reefers that travel from the PRC ports to fleets near Ecuador, Peru, Chile, and Argentina shows that each reefer is on a rotation that has it visiting a DWF fleet in the Americas every six months ²².

In terms of criticality, the reefers are the highest priority with the fishing trawlers second. In terms of vulnerability, the fishing trawlers are the most vulnerable due to their overt and illegal presence within South American EEZs while the reefers stay outside, maintaining an indirect connection to the illegality. If either type is positively ID’d while conducting illegal fishing or aiding and abetting illicit activity; they are susceptible to enforcement under the guise of UNCLOS Article 56, state specific laws relating to maritime sovereignty, and international agreements such as the Port State Measures Agreement (PSMA).

Section Four: “Three Strikes” Escalatory Response Policy Framework

Given the U.S.’ clear interest in securing the maritime domain and removing PRC influence from its sphere of influence, the question to answer is how the U.S. can effectively counter the PRC’s DWF fleets in the Americas without unnecessary escalation. This requires a nuanced approach due to the delicate state of the geopolitical landscape and the potential for escalation aimed at U.S. partners in the SCS in response. Additionally, a solution must exist within the gray area between civil and military status that the PRC has exploited in the form of Coast Guard, CMM, and military trained fishing fleets. A purely military response would rely on forces spread thin around the world and risk PRC mirroring with the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in the SCS, while the status quo does nothing to raise the cost of PRC DWF fleet illicit actions in the Americas.

While a military reaction isn’t plausible due to bandwidth and escalatory concerns, the use of Letters of Marque and Reprisal (LOM) can provide American policymakers with a third way to address this issue. LOM provides a constitutional option for the U.S. to respond within the gray area that the PRC has dominated in its own claimed sphere of influence by the use of Article 1, Section 8, Clause 11 of the U.S. Constitution ³ which grants congress the power to issue LOM, incentivizing privateers or maritime Private Military Contractors (PMC) to take action. Privateers played a significant role in the American Revolution and War of 1812 with 55k seamen ²³ serving in such a capacity, seizing British ships and transporting American supplies ²⁴. In this case, they would provide the U.S. with a way to rein in PRC-sponsored illicit activity without further taxing the bandwidth of the U.S. military.

Implementation of LOM should take place within the context of a “three strikes” escalatory framework to respond to PRC DWF fleet EEZ violations on a ship-by-ship basis would increase the punishment of the violators to a greater extent as violations continue can fill this strategic gap. This framework assumes the willingness of the U.S. to act to enforce maritime security, particularly the EEZ standards within UNCLOS. In this framework the first “strike” or violation of a partner’s EEZ would constitute a formal notification to the International Maritime Organization ²⁵, Interpol, the shipowner of record, and flag registry. Essentially, the first violation would be recorded and tracked by relevant maritime institutions with the awareness of the state which operates the ship.

The second violation of a partner’s EEZ would result in an additional notification and the revocation of the ability to transit or conduct activities (regardless of the type) within U.S. or partner state EEZs again. In the case of a reefer that is aiding in illicit activity, this ship would face the same penalty in addition to being banned from U.S. and partner state ports. This step effectively has the offending ship blacklisted from U.S. and partner EEZs as well as their ports. In addition to this, other penalties or sanctions could also be considered against the Chinese SOE that is managing the specific offending ship in question. Given the motivations driving the PRC DWF fleets, this is not likely to stop their illicit activity entirely, and that is when the third strike will have to come into play and provide a forceful option.

The third EEZ violation of a ship would result in interdiction to seize, disable, or potentially destroy the offending ship. Upon the third violation, a ship would find its way onto a list authorized for reprisal or seizure on the part of PMCs. This provides a mechanism to react and stop violations without military. In addition to this, the fact that escalation to seizure or sinking takes place following numerous violations makes the response justified and the way this response takes place mirrors the use of civilian assets for coercive purposes that the PRC has utilized in its own claimed sphere of influence. Incentivizing privateers to react to illicit Chinese fleet activity after multiple violations is squarely within the bounds of the game the PRC has played in the maritime domain with the CMM.

One benefit to LOM in present times that has yet to be fully explored is the potential for the LOM to allow for reactions outside of mere interdiction. The spectrum of options for PMCs to utilize in accomplishing the task should not be limited to physical interdiction and should include all the options at their disposal including non-kinetics to disable violators. This includes the use of cyber effects that a PMC may have available as an alternative to physical interdiction. In instances when non-kinetics are an option, the PMC may not need to be physically located in the region to achieve the objective which could be more palatable for the partner state.

The “three strikes” framework is a practical and effective way to respond to PRC DWF fleet EEZ violations while avoiding military escalation and mirroring PRC gray-zone tactics in the SCS. It incrementally raises the cost of violations culminating in seizure or disablement while avoiding military use. Argentina stands out as an ideal initial partner due to its proactive stance and American ties, with tailored approaches for Ecuador, Peru, and Chile to follow. By curbing PRC influence, protecting regional interests, and reinforcing maritime norms, this approach strengthens U.S. dominance in the Western Hemisphere. Transforming a regional crisis into a strategic opportunity, enhancing security, economic stability, and environmental preservation for South American states while countering a strategic rival.

How the PRC responds to this deserves consideration, but it’s worth noting that much of the “three strikes” framework is designed to mitigate escalation with the PRC through multiple steps and by avoiding military use. So, what are the likely reactions that should be expected? The easiest option would be increasing the frequency and level of aggression with which the CMM responds to Philippine ships in areas such as Scarborough Shoal or Second Thomas Shoal. Additionally, the U.S. and partner state should expect the PRC to flex whatever economic leverage the PRC has over the partner states to get them to break with the U.S. on this issue and remove the threat of privateers in the partner-state’s EEZ. On the other side of these reactions the U.S. would find an excellent opportunity to gain more favorable conditions in the SCS or waters around the Americas. Holding the threat of privateers over PRC DWF fleets could be used to gain concessions in the form of less aggression in the SCS or fewer, better behaved fishing fleets in the Americas. So, while the PRC may initially react, this framework could allow for a more stable strategic accommodation even if they do.

The unique geopolitical circumstances of each South American state will have an impact on the success of this policy and implementation should take this into consideration. Due to its willingness to take aggressive action against PRC DWF fleets in the past, current positive relations with the U.S., and their President’s fondness for private enterprise; Argentina is the best candidate in the Americas for this policy. Argentina should be the first state that the U.S. approaches with this policy proposal, because it is an outside of box idea that will likely need to be proven as successful in one location before it looks realistic to other states. Success in Argentina and a greater emphasis on the environmental aspect of this issue will make this policy more palatable for Ecuador and its ability to police illicit activity in its own EEZ as well as the GMR around the Galapagos Islands.

Peru and Chile will need the policy to be packaged with American investment to help them offset their dependence on the PRC overall. Specifically, Peru and Chile will need investment that can compete with what the PRC has provided them in port & rail infrastructure and their exports to the PRC which annually amount to $22.5B ²⁶ and $38.2B ²⁷, respectively. Lessening their dependence on the PRC while implementing this policy is a win-win for the U.S.

Conclusion

The persistent incursions of PRC DWF fleets into South American waters represent a multifaceted challenge involving environmental degradation, economic harm, and sovereignty violations that demands a strategic American response. If the U.S. fails to act PRC influence in the Americas will continue to go and a signal will be sent to the Americas that the U.S. isn’t serious about it. Considering the trajectory of the PRC footprint in the region, a greater military or intelligence footprint, which makes the U.S. less secure, is a logical outcome of this. This paper has outlined the scope of the issue, its alignment with U.S. grand strategy, the operational vulnerabilities of PRC fleets, and a practical framework to counter their illicit actions.

The “three strikes” escalatory policy, leveraging privateers under Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 of the U.S. Constitution, offers a nuanced and tailored solution. It incrementally raises the cost of violations culminating in seizure or disablement while avoiding military escalation and mirroring PRC gray-zone tactics in the SCS. Argentina stands out as an ideal initial partner due to its proactive stance and American ties, with tailored approaches for Ecuador, Peru, and Chile to follow. By curbing PRC influence, protecting regional interests, and reinforcing maritime norms, this approach strengthens U.S. dominance in the Western Hemisphere. Transforming a regional crisis into a strategic opportunity, enhancing security, economic stability, and environmental preservation for South American states while countering a strategic rival.

Footnotes